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The moment of this story's end was in 1709, when an article appeared in the scientific
journal of the Jesuit order in Paris, Journal de Trévoux. After decades of abuse of rationalist
philosophies in general and Descartes' in particular, the first sign of the changes to come
appeared as Cartesianism and its values found acceptance within traditional establishments
which would have been unthinkable thirty years earlier. They wrote,
Occult qualities, especially those associated with attraction and pesanteur, were
once thought to be so banished from physics and from nature by M. Descartes,
that greatest of geometers. One only talked about them when looking for an
example of false reasoning founded upon infantile prejudices. Able English
mathematicians, however, have returned them to the world. 1
The philosopher whom these partisans of a traditional cultural order had, from his textual debut
in 1637 until this moment, represented as a peddler of “atheistic and materialistic mechanism”
now served in defense against a greater threat from across the Channel, which was represented in
France by attractionists in the English style.2 This theoretical position, espoused as Isaac
Newton's doctrine of Universal Gravitation, was antithetical to the sensibilities of the French
establishment based in the “New Philosophy,” and was rejected on principle until it was no
longer feasible to do so.3 This suggestion that the workings of nature might consist in themselves
of relations for which neither the eye, nor the mind's eye, could ever hope to gain a basis for
understanding, was not only regarded as a metaphysical impossibility but an insult to the good
name of the subject of knowledge as well. Explanations in terms of action at a distance were
called occult, a term which scholastic discourses of the day used to mean “insensible,” but which
1

J.B. Shank, The Newton Wars & the Beginning of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2008): 125.
2
Ibid., 126.
3
Roger Hahn, The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: The Paris Academy of Sciences, 1666-1803. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1971): 5. This turning point occurred decades into the eighteenth century, well after
the end date for this project, and is studied as the Enlightenment.

3

under Cartesian usage came to also mean “unintelligible,” in virtue of their crucial theoretical
conflation of the two.4 In many regards, this is the story of the period of most confusion in the
course of the emergence of the metaphysics of modern science, which is to say, prior to such
metaphysical questions being subsumed by a regime of mathematical modeling; precisely how
abstracta might represent particular states of affairs in this way was an open question. Those
who rejected the old science still taught dogmatically in the schools and longed instead for a new
one had to create the discourses they needed to justify their views themselves, and do so in the
face of ostracism. It is precisely because it is not yet the scientific establishment it would become
that Cartesianism is of such importance.
This narrative is structured as a historical interpretation of the western-civilizational
“father of modern science” theme, not in the explanatory capacity it has served these past three
centuries, but as a historically finite act of creating (as a text) the possibility of philosophical
evolution within a community. As a genealogical account of the social formations which
contextualized the “New Philosophy” as both sufficiently illicit and exciting to be referred to
without name, this is an exploration of the tenuous road to founding fatherhood.5 This paternity
which is typically only considered after its establishment as an important explanatory frame,
typically considered a new discipline of knowledge, will appear instead as a long and uncertain
path through a contentious period of French history. It is precisely the moments of “breaking
away from existing structures” in which the author faces the likelihood of ostracism but also the
possibility of producing the “original works that can found a system.”6 There are many factors
which go into the embrace of a course of study other than truth, if truth is taken as something
simple and transferable which can be disencumbered from its discursive situation. This is a
4
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history of the role which those factors played at the discursive root of modern science. Thus texts
and even metaphysical postures are interpreted primarily in terms of their situation within a
historically evolving material (and immaterial) culture, rather than on their basis in the history of
philosophy as a cohesive reconstruction, and are instead approached as emerging
idiosyncratically within a socio-discursive space which was saturated with ulterior motives (most
of which, it will be argued, were self-preservative.)
In light of this relationship with the documentary evidence, as directed towards an
understanding of the institution of attributing forefathers to intellectual modernity, there is one
historical interface which appears most crucial:that between the men said to have founded
modern philosophy and modern science, René Descartes and Isaac Newton respectively. That
division of the spoils of historical creation is today indelible. However, there was a time when it
looked for all the world as though Descartes would be remembered as father to both. Not only
was Cartesian dualism the metaphysical system purpose-built to ground a new universal
scientific study of the world, but a few decades after Descartes' death many of the best minds in
France were busily realizing that vision, expanding his doctrines in chemistry, physics,
astronomy, anatomy and biology to name only the most empirical. No thinker has ever had this
complete a command of the theoretical and doctrinal grounds for scientific output, apart from the
millennium-long Aristotelian hegemony which Cartesianism displaced. The twist to this
remarkable proliferation was that institutional Cartesianism did not see the light of day until it
was on its way out. After decades of official marginalization, this worldview was given a
strongly implicit place in Royal Academy of Sciences, so long as it not speak its name. The
strange social postures that practitioners of the New Philosophy were required to adopt in order
to thrive locates them within a broader series of developments in the bearings and manners of
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French elite culture across the seventeenth century, particularly regarding how the ubiquity of the
printed word should be dealt with, especially in maintaining civility through intellectual dispute.
The power that evidently stemmed from the descriptive autonomy of the (sociodiscursively) Cartesianized subject was desired by the king and his ministers for their practical
and technological purposes, despite being fearful of his revolutionary potential. Because the
latter was conceived in theological terms, a disjunctive relationship between institutional
discourses of unambiguous condemnation and asymmetrical and fluid norms governing socially
appropriate behavior took hold. The situation was contested across the university and collegiate
establishment, in the presses, and as an engagement in the early modern struggle between king
and pope called Gallicanism; in these ways the conflict was always bound up in the relationship
between words and the truth, and who had the power to judge between the two. Fittingly, the
metaphysical nature of the miraculous Eucharistic substance was a central point of disputation,
as a morally charged proving ground of the descriptive authority, but one which was becoming
less meaningfully a Catholic monolith. The most successful strategy was to remain silent
whenever possible. This tact was taken in the Academy, where philosophy was not disputed, and
Cartesianism was not addressed, until it came time to defend itself from the outside from
Newtonianism, by which time it had established institutional inertia of its own. Thus the
chronological scope is fitted to giving an account of the social world that led Descartes to
communicate the vision that he did, and the subsequent period of intellectual insularity under
Louis XIV that allowed such a unique discourse to emerge.7 The long seventeenth century of
French Cartesianism ranges from 1598 to 1709, with the Edict of Nantes serving to mark the
beginning of the intellectual “shopping period” which never materialized, and 1709 marking
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both the Jesuit's settling for Cartesianism and the king's eviction of the scandalous Port-Royalist
faction of the Jansenist movement.
The term metaphysics is used as follows in a manner which is both cavalier and
anachronistic. This is done from a historiographic angle. Due to the insurmountable
epistemological issues presented by the terms of Cartesian dualism, and the restrictions of the
normative theology of the era, as well as the lack of previously established discourses of modern
philosophy, the possibility of a situation of generalized metaphysical discourse was not only
illusive, but actively suppressed. The norm of separation between the principles of being in
theology from those of, say, optics, was the discursive situation these French philosophers were
forced to contend with. Thought on the private, phenomenal nature of substance in particular
could not be generalized without interfering with observation of transubstantiation. So
metaphysics is used here to point to the broader kinds of discourses which rationalists tried to
have, and did with some success, in which basic phenomena are described and considered for the
possible structures by which they relate. This term allows for the sufficiently general
consideration of how theory operates to account for some state of affairs, and how a kernel of
philosophical dispute continued to announce itself, even though it was often submerged under far
more pressing socio-political concerns.
Despite the polemics Cartesians directed toward the scholasticism of the descriptively
powerful university system, the metaphysical horizon which appeared intuitively to even the
thoroughly philosophical would not have featured many insightful theoretical structures which
had not also been available to the “ancient and approved authors” whose legacy the bishopric,
the parlement, and the departments and colleges of the University of Paris all saw fit to defend
by explicitly banning the propagation of named rationalist doctrines, general perspectives,
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particular theses, irreverent attitudes, and antihumanism (more on that last one) to the extent they
were able, in addition to the Jesuit order's constant barrage of attacks grounded in ethical norms,
condemnation by the king of France and the pope of Rome as well as the moralizing censors
under both, and censure within various monastic orders, despite the fact that the so-called
modernist thought which emerged during the first two-thirds of the century was, philosophically
speaking, a recap of the classics. Their inheritance drew heavily on the Platonic and NeoPlatonic (and thereby Augustinian) discourses of intelligible ideals and transcendental unities, as
well as Aristotelian responses dealing in seemingly equally absolute terms such as universal
predication, except that they are invoked in the course analyzing what is necessary to a
relationship with a particular and perhaps describing that state of affairs accurately in the
process, rather than as a naming of something common to phenomena. Sensitivity to the subtle
differences in the way the meaning of language is grounded by each of these metaphysical
attitudes was entirely obscured by centuries of the institutionalized Thomistic reading of
Aristotelian metaphysics, which emphasizes an absolute correspondence between accurate
descriptions and kinds of beings (the role that ostensive or gestural reference plays in Aristotle's
engagement of substance in categorical discourses seems to have been entirely forgotten by his
scholastic adherents.) The structural role God played in not only grounding the meaning of
language, but also first causes, as well as ethical virtues, certainly warranting the Bible's
appearance on any list of formative and ancient metaphysical tracts. The classical toolkit is
rounded out by the coherence of the abstract figures of Euclidean geometric analysis, the
Archimedean infinitesimal, (the infinitely small base-unit of infinite subdivision) Epicurean
atomism, (the finitely small and changeless base-unit of classical materialism) and the
foundational opposition between Parmenidean beings and Heraclitean becomings. With these
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they also inherited the host of traditional questions concerning the identity of part-whole
relationships, the reconciliation of the infinity of time and space to the human scale, and the like.
However, the metaphysical structure which was perhaps most culturally naturalized of all
these was hylomorphism, the Aristotelian account of substantial being as consisting of the unity
of form and matter. These were regarded as being incomprehensible taken independently from
one another, as unstructured matter does not exist and an immaterial substance is an absurdity.
However, the theoretical severance that is called Cartesian dualism did strike most directly at the
immediacy of the united being of the discernible phenomenal object and its real substrate of
existence.8 For better or for worse this was the truest metaphysical innovation of early modern
philosophy, and which produced the possibility of a culture in which it might be said that “the
senses deceive,” let alone one in which such sentiments were a tenet of orthodoxy. 9
Descartes’ dualistic thesis provides an answer to a longstanding question in philosophy:
what is the precise nature the relation that holds between the mental and the material?
Contemporary accounts, such as Renaissance naturalism and scholastic Aristotelianism, saw the
two as fundamentally inseparable, although to a greater and lesser degree respectively. 10 By the
scholastic account, all things in the world exist as the union of an intelligible form (that whichh
makes them what they are) and a material substrate (that which makes them tangible and
consistent.) To the Cartesian, this amounts to an absurdity, being the claim that human concepts
and purposes are somehow in the matter which is studied by physics. No, they respond, one may
indeed experience things variously as named and useful, but these features of experience are no
less mental than experience itself. They agree wholeheartedly with the Aristotelian view of
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matter as inherently unobservable, but whereas the Aristotelian views matter as a component of
(or at least intimately implicated by) an object of experience, Cartesian dualism is first and
foremost the theoretical isolation of the two. And, just as for Aristotle, the relationship between
form and (standard material) body also explains the possibility of a person's habitation of his or
her body, hylomorphically. By rejecting Aristotelian substance ontology without a meaningful
replacement, Descartes created the problem of mind-body interaction which has been with
philosophy ever since.
Whereas the dominant view prior to Descartes’ intervention took the substantial (for
present purposes, real unto itself) to be as the commonsense union described, and interpreted
essences to vary as widely as do things, Descartes presented a radically minimalistic ontological
vision. Cartesianism holds that there are two substances, both unitary in essence. These two
modes of being constitute all of reality, are nothing like each other, and do not depend on each
other two exist.11 The material substance Descartes calls res extensa, or the extensive thing, and
its name already expresses most of what can be known about it. It is the dimension of infinite
space and the bodies which take up various amounts of it. Of the traditional four causes, only the
efficient cause has any place in the affairs of extended bodies in motion, as the energetic impulse
produced by a collision. Only such pushes are intelligible. The other substance is res cogitans,
the thinking thing which characteristically lacks extension, but is thoughts. The argument from
cogito ergo sum to the substantial thing which is the res cogitans has enjoyed a long history of
refutation, most famously by Kant (putting an end to the particularly early-modern style of
existence questions.)12 The argument was at any rate clearly motivated by a desire for
ontological parity between the totality of intelligibles and intellection on one hand and the
11
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totality of movables and motion on the other. Descartes needed to present his original
observation of “I think” as not grounded by a material body. By defining each so as to be wholly
dissimilar, he is able to conclude that consciousness as such cannot be grounded materially, in
virtue of the “distinctness of discernibles” principle attributed to Leibniz, and thus must exist on
its own basis as substance.13 The kernel of Descartes’ metaphysical work is that mind and matter
are so different that nothing of the one can bear upon the other. This conclusion was motivated
by a discomfort with the direct-realist view of perception, and ontologizes its inadequacy. The
practical result of this was to pose the epistemological question like never before, both more
emphatically yet with dramatic new restrictions.
Descartes rather infamously did not deliver an answer to the question which he posed
with such intensity: how can one discover the truth of a state of affairs from nothing but
appearances? He leaves his epistemological account as a sort of naive “intuitionism,” such that
the interpretive truth of the “clarity and distinctness” of a phenomenon must also play the part of
carrying formal weight, to the extent that it grounds necessary inferences about the existence of
the world.14 This is just one of the many theoretical puzzles which stem from this strange
substance dualism, but it also invokes the nature of the broader metaphysical problem: the
Cartesian subject can make use of only that which consists in finite, temporally bound
phenomena of awareness, and on that basis alone must discover the principles of the world which
are given thereby but which are not themselves bound up in that way.
Perhaps most pressing among consequences, what in the world is a Cartesian to do when
in response to one's testimony concerning the distinct clarity of an experience, someone
demands, “prove it”? To refuse is to do so would be a humiliating indication that the claim had
13
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been unfounded. However, to attempt to do so would in the vast majority of cases mean to take
theoretical steps beyond those attributed to Descartes, a risky proposition regardless of how
modest they might seem. Taking steps towards incorporating an awareness of the role for a
uniquely Cartesian basis for self-conscious anxiety into historical consciousness of these
metaphysical discourses is the best preparation for the subsequent account of the socio-discursive
norms active in this domain through the seventeenth century in France.
And of course, even in the face of compelling interventions by church and state which
restrict an individual's behavior, human agents are not merely passively formed from without.
One acts preemptively, strategically, and on the basis of expectations. Thus it should be expected
that, as might be expected from any human social productions, the unfolding of Cartesian
metaphysical discourses will tend in a direction which avoids running afoul of the normative
pressure against faux pas, all else being equal. It is truly a subtle object which is sought here. The
imposition of discursive boundaries, beyond which philosophical inquiry is forbidden to stray by
established cultural authorities, is an interesting subject in its own right. But accepting the
importance of this phenomenon of non-technical forces dictating conditions of the structure of
technical discourses, a distinct question can subsequently be posed: how did technical discourses
structure themselves, particularly considering that these evolutions were always necessarily
articulated within the bounds of norms governing deviance of thought? The answer is that
control of the evolution of what came to be legitimate Cartesian metaphysics immediately
following the philosopher's death was held by the small group of men who also held control of
his unpublished manuscripts. Authority of this sort was far more effectively grounded in appeals
to social factors than theoretical ones. This authority was deployed to shape Cartesianism on the
basis of a theory of occasionalism, which in functional terms made it a useful system for
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rendering descriptions while to a great extent undermining any metaphysical basis for the
possibility of theologically (and thus politically) meaningful claims. In this way, historical
French Cartesianism was, as a mainstream affair, unmistakably invested in subordinating itself
to the demands placed on it by society, while nevertheless maintaining the meaning of its kernel
of independent power. In many ways, this grounds an analysis of the metaphysics of privilege.
A disclaimer here: there is shockingly little science in what follows if science is to be
understood in modern disciplinary terms. This is despite the fact that scientific knowledge was
always the goal of the new rationalist philosophies. Science, however, as a kind of knowledge,
had been central to western intellectualism since Aristotle. The modernists did not invent any
radical new taste for accuracies which had been absent. And indeed, much of the Cartesian
science was deeply incorrect. The various positive descriptive doctines will be mentioned as they
make themselves relevant, and especially when they do so by either stemming from metaphysical
allegences or burdening the scientist in question with political obligations. The proper place for
the technical aspects of this study is informed most of all by Descartes himself, who deeply
opposed the distinction and even the specialization of the various disciplines of scientific study
as a misrepresentation of the unity of their grounds in philosophical principles, a view which he
inherited from Aristotle.15 In terms of the social history of the objects of study in the natural
world, Descartes entered the story immediately following the condemnation of Galileo, and
formulated his outlook on that basis.16
In the interest of preparing the way, a provisional set of answers to the question posed in
the title will be given, in increasing order of abstraction. Firstly, modern science needed a real
father to pay the bills. Virtually everyone who appears in this story was independently wealthy
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and many famous, and this was seen as indispensable to being the right sort of man for the job.
Secondly, modern science needed a textual father-figure such as Descartes to rally around in the
face of opposition and to provide an initial working orthodoxy or consensus. This is the way in
which the term founding father is used, as the authorial unity of a body of work which created
the possibility that a new descriptive discourse emerge. And lastly, modern science needed
someone to model the behavior appropriate to this new domain of human activity. Someone to
serve as an example of how to weigh the various demands in coping with the uncertainty of
pioneering a new kind of human subjectivity, in the face of nebulous opposition. This last
concern is taken up in chapter one, wherein Descartes' motivations are considered and the
beginning of first published work, Discourse on Method, is read for its elitist thesis. This
account of his guide on how to act and how to treat others, or social Cartesianism, will be used
to inform considerations of his historical adherents, as presented in the second chapter. The ways
in which they claimed both socio-political and metaphysical authority, and the way they worked
to yield the same to the power that decided their fate is the primary object of that chapter, while
chapter three investigates the adjustment to the legitimacy and publicity of the Academy, and
how a certain set of values were reproduced through its institutions and discourses.

14

Chapter One
Coming to Terms with Paternity
The behavior that Descartes modeled for future philosopher-scientists constrained by
social norms was to avoid confrontation, beg for approval, flee the country if necessary, but then
when it is prudent, press one's advantage. This is not necessarily a bad thing, and seems to have
been the only way to do what he did with as much success as he had in absolutist France.
Particularly in his decision not to publish Le Monde, his heliocentric account of the cosmos after
hearing about Galileo's treatment by the traditional authorities through the 1630s, can be seen an
analogous relationship to that astronomer's fate as Aristotle expressed to Socrates, in vowing not
to let Athens sin again against philosophy; the wise response may indeed be whatever sort of
self-censure is necessary.17 Descartes spent most of his working life abroad, visiting Denmark
and Sweden, traveling through Germany and Italy, and living most of the time in the United
Provinces. He returned to what would be the metropolis of his philosophical system on multiple
occasions, but never to stay for long. Ultimately, though, this is not the story of his world, but the
one he created.
Prior to the dissemination of Descartes’ dualistic thesis and skeptical method, begun
when he went to print in 1637, there was virtually no intellectual structure to speak of.18 More
specifically, there was still one which functioned as a political norm but which had ceased to
demand the respect necessary to deserve good-faith credence. The situation created by the
convergence of numerous factors destabilizing society during the first half of the seventeenth
century, ranging from drought to newfound worry concerning the freedom of the will, is aptly
17
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developed by philosopher of rhetoric Stephen Toulmin, whose historical work on the evolution
of early modern scientific epistemology has influenced this project a great deal.19 The
epistemological authority of a revealed religion and its single, unified church had been broken a
century prior by the beginning of the Protestant movement, but for a time this challenge had
remained doctrinal. This was intellectually harmful enough, producing “a loss of authority on
every side.”20 For the first time in European Christendom, theologians could “give no
unanswerable arguments,” resulting in a turn toward skepticism for the intellectual elite. 21 The
1598 Edict of Nantes was a failed attempt to forestall social violence by guaranteeing religious
toleration in France. But even it is had succeeded in preventing the politicization of conviction
regarding spiritual authority, the public discursive space for “the authority of inner conviction”
had been forced open by the emergence of multiple choices; thus it is no surprise that the very
nature of this newly conceived faculty of the mind would be “also the central philosophical issue
for Descartes.”22 It was the Thirty Years War, triggered by the opportunistic involvement of the
growing ecclesiastical schism in the factional politics of German princes, which destroyed any
remaining explanatory power of the church as an organ of culture. It was a rather new and
troubling situation that could lead anyone, let alone a Frenchman, to admit that he “could select
from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of preference” as Descartes does.23 At
this vulnerable moment, rapid expansion of exploration and trade with cultural centers of the far
east further eroded credence in medieval eurocentrism.24 This conflict contextualized the
19
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untethered situation of the thinking public, and it was during which Descartes produced his
works.25
While the political situation on the ground ripped individuals out of the comfortable
context of received answers to epistemological questions and demanded that they come to a
personal conclusion regarding the very nature of truth, a contrary but equally unsettling picture
was emerging from the heavens. This was the mechanistic heliocentrism of Galileo, and the
permanent disruption of the “snug, finite universe” that had dominated cosmology since
Aristotle.26 Descartes’ fascination with the possibility of an underlying structure explaining the
regularities of the observable orbits predated the philosophical concerns for which he is primarily
known, and only remained unpublished on the matter for the sake of maintaining public loyalty
to church authority.27 In fact it was in taking seriously this notion of a mechanical universe,
composed of discrete parts causing reactions in one another in accordance with absolute and
comprehensible laws, which drove Descartes to his famous considerations of selfhood. Toulmin
argues that his path toward dualism was far less “a spontaneous product of his own selfunfolding ésprit,” than it was “a response to problems.”28 This is a concern which today attends
far more closely to neurobiology than it does astrophysics, but that emerged in the seventeenth
century as a picture of a totalizing order of causal relations first began to appear: if all physical
events unfold as energetic interplay between entities following absolute and intelligible laws, and
humans are physical entities, is one not entirely subsumed by vast cosmic forces? On its face this
is a monumental question. But rather than having due time to ponder, a “state of general crisis”
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demanded that one take a stance, not in regards to this question, but in general, with this problem
calling into question the possibility of stance-taking.29
Thus the individual, perhaps no more than a clockwork automaton, was now under
obligation to give an account of existence after a millenium of authority. As a point of departure
in addressing this tall task, Descartes forwarded his famous conception of consciousness “as
forming a distinct, immaterial, nonmechanical realm.”30 Likewise will it orient a beginning here.
While a great deal remained uncertain, the metaphysical severance of mind and body allowed
two points of fixity moving forward: all things exist rationally, and this rationality can be
represented; and that the mind exists, apart, not governed by this reductive rationality, but able to
recognize it, if only the proper precautions are taken. The Cartesians saw both of these premises
taken together as a promise “that nature is transparent to human reason,” or that objective truths
of the world can turn up as such as an experience for certain people at certain times.31 The
ultimate goal and foundational belief about this relationship was that “man's limitless reason
would eventually succeed in representing the totality of nature.”32
From the middle of the seventeenth century when Cartesianism was so taken up by
discourses of natural philosophy and metaphysics as to, for a time, become almost invisible in
sufficiently pragmatic and secular circles, and from the same time through to the present as a set
of epistemological concerns with which every single philosophical discourse has had to cope, for
better or for worse, a great deal has been said on the subject of the Cartesian legacy. Indeed,
while the so-called foundationalist project in epistemology carries on in largely the same vein as
Descartes began it, in which skeptical criteria of belief justification remain the primary object of
29

Ibid., 124.
Ibid., 135.
31
Richard S. Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics, in History of Science,
eds. George Basalla and William Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977): 1.
32
Erickson, 78.
30

18

study, post-modern and revisionist readings of Cartesian texts also abound.33 Of these latter,
Susan R. Bordo provides a useful historiography, introducing key interpretations of Descartes’
thought which emphasize situation within a particular “psychocultural framework.”34 The theme
of “domination” inherent to the pursuit of a mechanically reductive cosmos has been noted by
past commentators, and the driving concerns of “insecurity and uncertainty” have likewise been
given historical context here and elsewhere.35 Plenty has also been written regarding Descartes
the scientist, and it is this that has often appeared most radical (as opposed to generally
postmodern interpretations which benefitted from the support of a broader intellectual
movement) against the established conventions of a “narrowly combative and unhistorical study
of the philosophers of the past which has been so characteristic of recent analytic philosophy.”36
Desmond M. Clarke in particular has provided a thorough study of Descartes’ explicitly
empirical writings and worldview, arguing for the overhaul of his image to reflect his
subordination of metaphysics to physics, and to dispel the myth that he was opposed to
experimentation which has held since his lifetime.37 This sort of work is directly relevant to the
current undertaking, for it is an examination of what, within a discursive community utilizing
Cartesian thought categories, it is possible to claim. But this is only half of a picture of the
savant as socio-political subject, albeit the much better discussed one. Before building up the
powerful methodological tools for which he is known, Descartes went to great lengths to set their
limits, with particular attention to who may and who must not wield them, and how.
Interpretation of the model of subjectivity he articulates is important to the history of social
differentiation, but it is only the beginning. The analysis of the Cartesian social subject will lead
33
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into that of its latter manifestation as expanded by the doctrine of Occasionalism, as exemplified
by the work of Nicolas Malebranche. It was his followers, Cartesians engaged in mathematical
analysis of mechanical relations, just as their namesake had been, who took up arms against
Newtonian physics at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It is against this backdrop of
socially-inscribed epistemological powers that the Newtonian mode will be juxtaposed; perhaps
roughly, if scarce mention to this point is any indication, but hopefully in a manner which best
illuminates for the reader the political implications of the stylistic and thematic dissonance
between his works of natural philosophy and the French milieu with the savant enshrined at its
institutional heart.
Cartesian bildungsroman
Early in the first chapter of Descartes’ entrance into the scrutinized world of public
intellectualism, his Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking the
Truth in the Sciences, he relates a moment of formative passage across a similar threshold. But
unlike that of 1637, when he cemented the interdependence of the persona of René Descartes and
the meaning of his act of writing, the threshold which can be dated to 1616 concerns the
transformation of his place in the world vis-à-vis reading. He affirms that from childhood, he had
always placed great stock in the testimony of “letters,” and pursued them at the Jesuit college of
La Flèche, founded just seven years before Descartes’ 1610 enrollment as a welcome-back gift
by a backpedaling Henri IV, who sought reconciliation with the Jesuit order which he had
banished from the country in 1595 after the first Papist attempt on his life.38 Jesuits and other
radicalized Catholics were in no hurry to accept Henri’s apology for his transgressions against
the spiritual unity of the French realm, and his efforts appear to have failed given his 1611
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assassination.39 A noteworthy obligation that the king included in the foundation of the school
was to enshrine his heart in its chapel upon the occasion of its disuse, presumably as an
expression of his legitimacy as the Catholic king of France. As a reciprocal expression of their
political loyalty, the Jesuit teachers marked each anniversary with an “instructional and
devotional” celebration called the Henriade; Descartes was present for the first of these, the
enshrining of the monarchical relic.40 In this light it is little surprise that the teen who watched
his passionately credulous teachers honor the embodiment of political authority, whom they had
despised, would find that “as soon as [he] had finished the entire course study, at the close of
which it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned, [he had] completely changed
[his earlier] opinion”; there was no order, even beyond that lack which was inherent to the
learning itself! Unnerved by the troubling abundance of conflicting appeals to authority which
disrupted French life in his period, he “was convinced [that he] had advanced no farther in all
attempts at learning, than the discovery at every turn of [his] own ignorance.”41
Of course, anyone familiar with the most widely taught pair of modern philosophical
texts (Discourse on Method and his 1640 Meditations on First Philosophy) would recognize that,
while written with intimately personal tone and device, references to contemporary events like
this are virtually absent. This facetious presentation “merely as a history,” which is nevertheless
expunged of historical detail, has aided in a long tradition of decontextualized interpretations.42
However, not all details of Descartes’ personal history are omitted, and those which are included
are a valuable window into the extent to which the Cartesian subject is truly intended to be
universally relatable. In the passage above, Descartes presents an account of his descent into
39
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uncertainty. It is fictionalized to the extent that it appears he experienced no clean break like this;
therefore, the choice of when to locate his moment of doubt should be interpreted as intentional.
Having incorporated all the learning of past ages, he holds the prized intellectual resources of his
time. And indeed this entitles him to membership in “the order of the learned.” But it is only
then, once he has demonstrated his belonging within an elite community, if he should choose to
accept it, that he hesitates. The theme at play here is that developed through the beginning of the
Discourse on Method, unfolding into an explicit doctrine of intellectual exclusivity on the basis
of class-bound resources which is made sure to be in place prior to the philosophical work of the
tract beginning in earnest.
The opening line of the Discourse on Method is an affirmation that “good sense” is “the
most equally distributed” of all human virtues.43 This may seem an odd start given the suggestion
that he ultimately restricts who may utilize “that alone which constitutes us men,” and of those
who may, how.44 What he expresses is that it is not in terms of the nature of the faculty itself that
the savant is distinguished from the general population, and this serves an important role in the
development of the metaphysical basis of the “community of equals” ideal: namely, that those
who are ultimately inducted into the full meaning of Cartesian subjectivity definitely possess
“the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error,” for it “is by nature equal in
all men.”45 Insofar as it is an innate faculty, reason does not vary by degree. This means that
when the work of Cartesian intellectuals does get under way, there is no room to call into
question an adversary’s access to intellection itself as an explanation for disagreement. The most
one could do to insult a peer would be to call them misled, which is to say that they “conduct
[their] thoughts along different ways, and do not fix [their] attention on the same objects,” an
43
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assertion which maintains a close connection to the study at hand.46 It should also be noted that
these initial assurances as to the universality of reason are made in the absence of the
characteristic Cartesian doubt developed a few pages later. He is merely “disposed to believe”
that it is so, and interestingly, cites “the common opinion of philosophers,” that variance by
degree “holds only among the accidents, and not among the forms or natures of individuals of
the same species.”47 These philosophers are clearly Scholastics, for the terminology he attributes
to them is explicitly Aristotelian. While basic Aristotelian ontological concepts do turn up here
and there in modernist thought which for the most part attempted to abandon them, this passage
is unique in Descartes. Alongside his plain disinterest in demonstrating this particular claim in
his own rigorous terms, this brief use of a philosophical mode which he does not take seriously
leads to the conclusion that the universality of reason is to be maintained on its grounds as a
nicety, albeit a formal and important one. Rather than over-commit to this point, ample room is
left for the individual to affirm his personal right.
The savant ideal entails not only this sort of hand-waving at the intellectual potential of
the general population, but also a deep respect for the power of the individual, as individual.
Despite his humble assurances that he “never fancied [his] mind to be in any respect more
perfect,” it is Descartes’ alone which is in a position to be tested on the basis of its own merits.48
He famously sets out to make himself “an object of study,” and while he claims his goal is
“choosing the paths [he] ought to follow,” it is ultimately apparent that this adventurous
existential objective can be at best taken metaphorically.49 This is to say that he proceeds to
consider which sorts of beliefs should be given credence, but not until after making explicitly
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clear that there is no path open before him which leads to unconventional actions of social
consequence. So as he praises the capacity of the insightful mind to reshape the world of
understanding, he is careful to explicitly denounce any attempts to impose intellectual
developments on the social world. These two arguments will be explicated successively, such as
to build a picture of how hierarchical power and elite privilege are implicated at the metaphysical
heart of Cartesian dualism.
One of the primary attractions of the savant is his capacity to operate as a programmatic
visionary. As will be increasingly clear, the scope of this power was be closely bound by social
norms, but nevertheless a certain creativity is prized. In particular “the difficulty of reaching high
perfection with but the materials of others to operate on” is emphasized, revealing an
unsurprising regard for the sort of whole-cloth programs in which Descartes is himself
engaged.50 Given Descartes’ conviction that objective truth is accessible to the perfected
rationality, it follows that books of science, “composed as they are of the opinions of many
different individuals massed together,” would appear “farther removed from truth than the
simple inferences which a man of good sense…draws respecting the matters of his experience.”51
This emphasis on expertise would be confusing if taken outside of the context of Descartes as
mechanist and natural philosopher; if his project were solely an epistemological one, what object
of knowledge could set two individuals apart? He says that he trusts most a man making claims
“with reference to the affairs in which he is personally interested,” because the reality of his
work “must presently punish him if he has judged amiss.”52 This is contrasted with claims made
by the “man of letters in his study, regarding speculative matters… followed by no consequences
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to himself,” other than to “foster his vanity.”53 This comparison directly contradicts the strict (yet
widespread) reading of Descartes as somehow intellectually trapped in the mode of Cartesian
doubt, rather than as is revealed historically, pursuing grounds for his and others’ discoveries of
natural order. While his secular philosophical posterity is generally unsatisfied by Descartes’
reaffirmation that “all the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive are true, [as being]
certain only because God is or exists, and because He is a perfect being,” he himself took the
matter as sufficiently settled to turn his attention to inquiry regarding the natural world.54 And as
an adherent to the common contemporary assumption regarding the existence of unified,
authoritative truth, a preference for works “completed by a single master” is no surprise; if truth
exists prior to human recognition of it, it must do so without the conceptual stitches and abrupt
terminological shifts characteristic of collaborative projects, or those “upon which different
hands have been employed,” and indeed, the truth itself was the product of a single master.55
It is not the proclivity towards comprehensive, programmatic thought which is odd
(Descartes is himself certainly one of history’s great system-builders), but rather, the civic
metaphors he deploys in conveying it. Perhaps he does so with the intention of preparing to
distance himself from actual overhauling projects, for at any rate, he begins by comparing the
elegance of a building designed and implemented from the ground up by a single architect with
one changed over time, “making old walls serve for purposes for which they were not originally
built.”56 This line characterizes especially well a modernist perspective on the Scholastic
tradition, then-current in the universities of Europe, insofar as it was an interpretation of
Aristotelian concepts a millenium in the making, and equally “an eclectic Thomism that had
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weathered three centuries of commentary and criticism.”57 Descartes continues to describe
longstanding “ancient cities which, from being at first only villages,” have grown over the ages
in such a way as to be “ill laid out compared with the regularly constructed” ones, which
benefitted from being “freely planned on an open plain.”58 By recognizing that the buildings of
the haphazard city “often equal or surpass in beauty those of the latter,” he acknowledges the
basis for attachment to the established tradition, namely the virtues of many of its works.59 But
the “indiscriminate juxtaposition” of buildings and “crookedness and irregularity of the streets”
leads one to conclude “that chance rather than any human will guided by reason” is responsible
for the structure of urban life.60 This could be a description of Paris in 1637, while France as a
whole is implicated in the next stage of the metaphor, which describes countries that began as “a
semi-barbarous state and advanc[ed] to civilisation by slow degrees.61 In such cases, the
emergence of the laws was guided “simply by experience of the hurtfulness of particular crimes
and disputes,” resulting in “less perfect institutions.”62 It is then, in contrasting this arrangement
with societies bound by “the appointments of some wise legislator” that he comes dangerously
close to revolutionary inference.63 It is at this point that he turns away, saying “that it is not
customary to pull down all the houses… but it often happens that a private individual takes down
his own with the view of erecting it anew.”64 Abandoning the metaphor now that he is done
creeping in the direction of insubordination, he concludes that it would “be preposterous for a
private individual to think of reforming a state by fundamentally changing it throughout,” with

57

Ariew, Dictionary, 2.
Descartes, Discourse, 54.
59
Ibid., 55.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid., 56.
58

26

the same being true for scientific curriculum.65 It is only as a personal act of self-improvement
that such measures are advisable. Thus, “social Cartesianism” would entail diligently pursuing
private investigations while maintaining a submissive demeanor in regards to political concerns,
for “large bodies, if once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up again… and the fall of such
is always disastrous.”66 And indeed, if “social Cartesianism” were in need of a pledge or mantra,
“I have never contemplated anything higher than the reformation of my own opinions” would
serve perfectly.67 This mantra is also to be recognized as a promise, regarding not the full
program of amelioration to power, but only the barest of minimums; opinions too can be made to
fit the dictates of authority, as the Cartesians a generation after Descartes showed. The degree to
which this conception of one’s appropriate place is reflected in the sociability of the Cartesians
and the public space of the Academy is striking.
So far a good part of the socio-cultural balance which Descartes felt must be securely in
place “before commencing to rebuild the house” has been addressed.68 Rational faculties have
been called universal in such a way as to extend an opportunity, while falling far short of arguing
that respect should follow generally on this implicit basis. Further, Descartes argues that there
are a great many improvements which rationality might uncover, but the ones which involve
compelling others are too inconvenient to pursue. Instead, one should study only inner depths, or
natural phenomena. A social conservative might thereby feel secure in knowing that sweeping
revisions have been denounced while the way of private reflection has been left open. But what
if the masses were to join together, tearing down all their own intellectual houses, acting as
individuals but nevertheless creating widespread disruption? Political ethicist William Bluhm has
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characterized Descartes as “ambivalently egalitarian/elitist.”69 The former component of this
description he defends on the basis of the passage concerning the equality of good sense which
has already been interpreted above as almost mockingly shallow. On this point he is entitled to
his reading, but to say in support of Descartes’ elitism simply that he displays an “admiration for
the preeminent mind” (he also addresses the merit of comprehensive institutions discussed
previously) is to miss the far stronger cases for such a claim present in the Discourse alone.70
When Descartes expresses outright scorn for “those restless and busy meddlers, who, called
neither by birth nor fortune to take part in the management of public affairs, are yet always
projecting reforms,” he gives voice to the appallingly high value he places on social rank in
determining the importance of an individual opinion for a so-called rationalist.71 Bluhm misses
the fact that disdain for the lesser is more prevalent than is regard for the greater. To reintroduce
the concern posed on behalf of a conservative elite, what is to prevent self-discovery run amok?
Descartes’ answer is straightforward: despite their alleged possession of good sense, most
people should not engage in critical thought, and instead leave such things up to the experts. He
makes it clear that he believes that philosophy is actually dangerous for them. While recognizing
that those wiser than he might see a better route to certainty than Cartesian doubt, “for the many”
he is far less charitable, saying that he is “much afraid lest even the present undertaking be more
than they can safely venture to imitate.”72 It can even inflict harm as an environmental hazard, to
the extent that philosophical talk which seems true “commands the admiration of the more
simple,” even when it is made up.73 He goes as far as to assert that “the majority of men is
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composed of two classes,” both of which are wholly discouraged from following after him on
epistemological adventures; the first of these contains the overly confident, who are “precipitate
in their judgments and want the patience requisite for orderly and circumspect thinking,” and
will lose their bearings and with them all practicality if they begin to doubt, whereas the latter
class consists “of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or modesty to determine that there are
others who excel them in the power of discriminating between truth and error, and by whom they
may be instructed,” already do well by accepting philosophical authority.74 This categorization of
“the majority of men” as, philosophically speaking, being one of either drones or disciples, is of
untold significance for the culture of thought which has followed the Cartesian example. This
insult of this condemnation is thought to be lessened, perhaps, by his claim that he too would
have lived out his life as a disciple if he had “never known the diversities of opinion… among
men of the greatest learning,” or if he had found the “one master” he earlier pursued.75 And while
the disputatious nature of the intellectual tradition to which Descartes is heir robbed him of this
“one master” in his own life, he is given potentiality as an archetype in the discussion of cultural
situation which marks the culmination of the socio-cultural introductory remarks of the work, as
well as the cultural attitude of the scientific project to the present day.
Descartes relates the diversity of philosophies inherited from Antiquity with the variety
of cultures entering European consciousness at the time, some of which appeared “decidedly
repugnant” from the continental perspective, but whose adherents ought not be labeled as
“barbarians and savages.”76 While this seems a positive step on its own, it is the first in
establishing a disingenuous, western approach to multiculturalism which in many regards
structures the intellectual landscape of imperial relations. He yields a certain autonomy to
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encultured modes of experience. The opportunity for him to do so has been discussed historically
as fairly new in Descartes time, when the “neutral, unbiased, ‘Archimedean’ view” had been so
undermined as to spur admission of “the inescapable locatedness of ideas.”77 This takes the form
of a statement contrasting “the very different character” of a person “with the same mind
originally,” raised either “from infancy in France or Germany,” or “among the Chinese or with
savages,” on the basis of which it is concluded “that the ground of our opinions is far more
custom and example than any certain knowledge.”78 This is to say that all culturally bound
viewpoints are to be expunged in the task of pursuing truth. Those who are for whatever reason
unwilling or unable to explicitly distance themselves from the “many errors powerful enough to
darken [their] Natural Intelligence,” they are prevented “from listening to Reason.”79 The cultural
norm articulated here, which soon finds expression as the “impersonal and univocal” style of
academic writing, is the establishment of detachment from worldly affairs, which has always
signified economic privilege, as the factor determining intellectual franchise.80 And while the
implications of such a policy are vast and will be discussed further, it might at least have aspired
to a kind of fairness if Descartes did not also write that, insofar as one must continue to act in the
absence of convictions, his best option was to emulate “the most judicious; and although there
are some perhaps among the Persians and Chinese” who equalled the wisdom of the best among
his own people, “expediency seemed to dictate that [he] should regulate [his] practice
conformably to the opinions of those with whom [he] should have to live.”81 This includes,
naturally, explicit recognition of the force “binding the parties to persevere,” of legal contracts
“for the security of commerce,” which he views as a measure “against the instability of men of
77
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feeble resolution.”82 That Descartes would go as far as to say that the legitimacy of law
enforcement and the profit motive is so secure as to be beyond any critical reflection, even in the
context of a thought experiment, should be taken as indicative of his priorities. This bold
decision to continue being French as a pretense appears as an item in his “provisory code of
Morals,” a structure addressing his need to “be furnished with some other house in which [to]
live commodiously during the operations.”83 In respect for the metaphor, it must be
acknowledged that some manner of laundering scheme is operating from the back door of
Descartes’ second property. His justification for the entire code is the same necessity of avoiding
being irresolute that he cites frequently, while to do so constitutes his second maxim. The third is
“to conquer [himself] rather than fortune,” meaning generally that “there is nothing absolutely in
our power,” a truth which is shortly recommended as a therapeutic response to the “regret [for]
the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth.”84 This consciousness is that to which he
attributes the capacity of ancient philosophers “to rise superior to the influence of fortune.”85 By
this he means a mere disinterest in the further accumulation of wealth; if the present narrative
indicates anything it should be the degree to which the influence of fortune is naturalized as the
necessary condition of critical thought itself and thereby rendered invisible, not to be overcome
but rather passed over uncritically as the norm among those who sit at the table of rational
subjectivity.
If one restricts “method” to mean actionable metaphysical program, then it is quite fair to
say that the Discourse on Method “gives the reader only brief hints of what that method is, four
brief, vague, and unimpressive rules.”86 But considering the extensive discoursing done to
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explain a method of rejecting nine out of ten of the minds which Descartes has nevertheless
called inherently capable of insight, on a pre-theoretical basis, or, as an explicit prelude to the
metaphysical considerations, it appears the true method may be one which has escaped critical
attention within patriarchal institutions of intellectual authority. By privatizing and individuating
the possibility of any manifestation of reality, Descartes introduced an uncanny element of
plausible deniability into every discourse concerning a common object, and every generalized
claim. What quickly became no less than a discursively enforced norm of epistemological
solipsism among a small group, but held an unspeakable appeal for countless other men of a
particularly urban professional nature.
Descartes’ Sword of Damocles
To say that “scientific knowledge is characterised by certainty rather than by absolute
truth,” or that it fundamentally consists of distinct notions or accurate states of awareness, is
simply to say that one is thinking about it, following through, and arriving at some justification
for holding it.87 This is a structural feature of Cartesian dualism which necessitates that the
epistemological role of Cartesian rationalism be only transitional, as the very production of a
rational explanation means to account for some phenomenon in more comprehensive terms.
Scientific knowledge itself is not absolute, but its grounds in human experience should strive to
be universal and certain. The autonomous cogito is at best a means of discovering the
possibilities of certain grounds for knowledge, but Descartes' epistemological intuitionism fell
well short of making full use of that.
It just so happens that there is a very good reason beyond simple embarrassment for
which a Cartesian (or at least Descartes himself) should want an epistemological peg on which to
hang his hat. Despite his lack of such a peg, Descartes nevertheless felt so strongly about the
87
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integrity of his foundationalism as the condition for the possibility of a “deductive unity of
science” that, in a 1639 letter to Marin Mersenne, father of modern acoustics and fellow graduate
from La Flèche, he requested that his own discourse be held to an inviolably high standard.88
This elective, one strike you're out policy which relates error to subsequent theoretical disgrace
could best be called Descartes' Ultimatum, and was expressed as the desire that, if it were ever
discovered that what he “had written on [blood circulation], or on refraction, or on any other
topic which [he had] dealt with in more than three lines.... [but which] turns out to be false, then
the rest of [his] Philosophy is worthless” as well.89 As no adequate explanation is available for
the choice to truly take on this responsibility in earnest, there are a few relevant conclusions
which can be drawn about Descartes and Cartesianism. One is that it was undoubtedly on
purpose that Descartes did not go around making similar challenges and including them in the
preface to his books. Instead, it seems as though he had been showing off to Mersenne. X : finish
Having indicated at length that, yes, René Descartes encorporates from the outset of his
philosophical agenda an entitlement to dominate the discourses concerning the perspectives and
worth of the weak and voiceless for much the same set of reasons that men of authority are
widely known to make use, the original connection of this hegemonic elitism to a vision of
knowledge grounded individualistically must be renewed. When Descartes argues that “a
plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of difficult discovery,” and that
even knowing the extent to which customary belief distorts one’s apprehension of truth, he still
asserts that “ it is much more likely that it will be found by one than by many,” it is clear that he
is advocating for a world of inequity and disenfranchisement.90 But this should also be tempered
by the recognition that truth as he understood it could potentially be disclosed absolutely,
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depending on the truth in question. Certain basic realities the mind can “know pre-reflexively,
via internal awareness.”91 While most of the facts of which one is generally considered confident,
such as the natures of the particulars in the world, fall well short of this, the standard of knowing
as an absolute transparency before a comprehending mind looms as that against which potential
knowledge is measured. Knowledge “about the sameness and difference of meaning” is a good
general example of something indubitable, for it is precisely what is considered transparent to
reason.92 The view is that knowledge takes objects; not the materiality of things in the so-called
“external world,” which one can never grasp directly, but rather, intelligible principles which one
apprehends by understanding them fully. 93 So when Descartes attributes the diversity of opinions
among the learned to the fact that they “conduct [their] thoughts along different ways, and do not
fix [their] attention on the same objects,” he means that there is some fundamental, formal
difference in how truth is reflected in these various minds.94 This is justified by the theoretical
principle that, as Desmond Clarke writes, “we have certain innate ideas or simple natures which
constitute the basic explanatory conceptual framework of science.”95 These are precisely the
basic and certain truths mentioned above. But while it is nevertheless Clarke’s conviction that
Descartes presents a functional account of scientifically valid knowledge, insofar as these innate
ideas only exist prior to sense experience as the form of potential understanding, the inclusion of
a Cartesian faculty of intuition which “is a kind of seeing with the mind’s eye,” would be taken
by many 21st century philosophers of science as insufficient grounds for anything that would
ultimately be called empirical truth.96 However, this longstanding view that Descartes
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“undervalues the significance of empirical evidence” requires the conflation of understanding
with proof, and is entirely put to rest by Clarke’s historical work.97 For present purposes the fact
that Cartesianism was simply called the “New Philosophy,” of the sort from which new
mechanical sciences of nature were liable to emerge.98
The capacity of discovery called “intuitus is equated with [the] clear and distinct
perception” which appears throughout Descartes’ works as the primary activity associated with
coming to know.99 That it is specifically ideas which are gained in this manner is Descartes' most
directly Platonic structure, for at the time of his writing the word was only used in a
philosophically technical way the works of Plato, as the direct adaptation of the word Plato used
for his Forms into Latin, without any precedent of scholastic usage; Descartes even went so far
as to tell Hobbes that he chose it “to refer to the forms of perception belonging to the divine
mind” of Saint Augustine's Neo-Platonic Godhead.100 This entails the ideal existence of an object
understood when a phenomenon is recognized correctly, and indeed the word idea is used to
indicate an ideal archetype, but is rooted in an etymological root for vision; an associated
metaphorical meaning of vision in this sense was the apprehension of a seeming which was
regarded as more truly seeing than seeing. Regardless of how seriously Descartes took this
Augustinian characterization of his metaphysics in passing, it would subsequently cast the
Malebranchean epistemology (which is very much like this) in an authoritative light. “Simple
natures” are a name Descartes calls the basic ideas which are deployed by the subject in
representing the knowledge of more complex ideas to itself, in such a way that is integral to
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understanding.101 Thus not only does he endorse the existence of an object of knowledge (an
idea) which is intuited, differences of which can account for differing opinions altogether, he
also postulates a particular subject of knowledge, which is responsible for comprehension and
which can produce differing accounts of the same reality. Any scientific theory understood in a
Cartesian context is a rational construction of a truth which emerged first as “a stream of
consciousness” within the experience of a particular mind.102 All possible facts are bound up
temporally in this way. When it is said that Descartes separated the mind from the body and the
natural world, this does not yet mean that representations of natural law were in any way
considered separate from the mind. Rather, Cartesian rationalism is in many regards understood
in the most metaphysically authentic manner when an ambiguously Platonic, comprehensive
gaze is permitted yet the ontological independence of res cogitans is also respected. It is not
unlikely that metaphysical ambiguities of this sort were played out in the Cartesian's favor more
often than not.
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Chapter Two
Testifying and Bearing Witness
Descartes gave the intellectual avant garde of the mid-seventeenth century, abandoned as
it had been between the nominal multiculturalism of 1598 and the “rocks of intolerance onto
which [the European social order] relentlessly drove after 1610,” a metaphysical anchorage; the
doctrine of the incommensurable res cogitans was that to which would-be rationalists would
hold through the “political, social, and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years’ War.”103
Less a tradition than a disperate proclivity with its roots in Platonism, rationalism is an approach
which prioritizes phenomena of understanding when giving philosophical explanations of the
possibility, quality, and content of knowledge. The unifying feature and the aspect which is most
relevant to present purposes is that “epistemological distinctions are grounded in ontological
distinctions.”104 The central distinction for Descartes was between the immaterial mind and the
mechanistic body, one which held such appeal “that there was hardly any natural philosopher of
that era in France” who did not take Cartesian dualism, if not thoroughly then as a
methodological aspiration.105 The labels “rationalism” and “Cartesianism” are often used
interchangeably in the context of early modern thought, and while this is inappropriate generally
speaking, it is vastly less so when referring to those who saw the natural world as intelligible and
sought to decipher it. “Virtually every scientist of importance” took the dualistic view in the
years around the creation of the Académie, and they did so for the same reasons that motivated
Descartes: with all appearances held apart from that which is conscious of them, any truth
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discovered thereby is objective, or such as reveals the exact nature of some indisputable entity,
without the ambiguity characteristic of a mystified subject.106 Yet as will be seen, a newfound
possibility is not the same thing as a system or method. Descartes never found any rational
feature in the world of perception which validated “itself in terms of correspondence with
reality,” and thus left none to his successors.107 The result of this was that any positive claim
about the sorts of natural phenomena which science studies carried an unavoidable burden of
truth. The most one could say was that he was personally convinced by the clarity of his insight,
and explain his reasons. Ultimately, the independence of the cogito which made it an important
new ground for truth also made it incommunicable as such, requiring one to take a stand
epistemologically, and to do so alone. This is, then, an investigation of the pre-theoretical social
reality which stood around and between the subjects of the Cartesian reduction, or, the
enmeshment of the truth-claimant cogito within a particular sociable subject. This is thus an
entry in the tradition of histories of the interaction between ideological structures and the
community identities of those who adopt them, albeit one concerning an austere metaphysical
system.
A necessary structure of human existence (the awareness-of, and its two component
features) was distinguished in the midst of a socio-political crisis, and was put to political ends
on the same basis. The latter of these claims is informed by the historical facts concerning the
strict engagement with this radically reductive metaphysical claim, and the play of power both
within and beyond the discourses which took orientation from it, and will be substantiated by
what follows. But regarding the former, the analysis is limited to this unsubstantiated principle of
intellectual history: that which appears to intuition will always be the true out of all which one is
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positioned to recognize intuitively. This is meant to apply generally, but especially to the
Cartesian case, wherein the philosophical contours were (to the wisdom that comes with
detachment, ironically) so evidently responsive to the situation of the day, despite adamant
denial of this well into the twentieth century. The declaration of a structurally unsituated basis of
epistemic authority, when in the face of the ruptured authority of the situating epistemology, can
be seen as no coincidence.
discourse of illegitimacy
Despite the demise of the explanatory power of the most traditional theological doctrines,
such that many among the learned came to view “church affiliation [as merely] a cultural
practice,” political institutions persisted in holding power over people and ideas, and continued
to cite spiritual authority for justification of its existence.108 This required preserving the
legitimacy of the intellectual tradition which underpinned it, made all the more crucial by the
nominal cession of the ecclesiastical monopoly over the French population. The period of the
Thirty Years War and the reign of Louis XIV witnessed collaboration between sacred and
temporal powers to label and marginalize subversive social elements on the Medieval model, but
with a uniquely modern concern for the institutional knowledge system which functioned as the
“pillar of an established order” itself, rather than being a reflection of a perhaps pre-1598 cultural
hegemony legitimizing both.109
This modern relationship was inaugurated in 1624, when the Theology Faculty of Paris
recommended a drastic new limit on the right of opinion and discussion which extended well
beyond religious conviction. The parlement of Paris enacted their request, banning the “holding
or teaching [of] any theses contrary to the ancient and approved authors,” with capital
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punishment a potential consequence of doing so.110 This legislation would today be dubbed the
“Aristotle Protection Act,” insofar as he was precisely the ancient and approved author they
sought to protect. By no means a Christian himself, those who populated the universities were,
and the knowledge of all subjects imparted there was formulated in terms of his mode of
categorical substantialism. But not only was their corpus dependent on an entrenched
classificatory system, components of that system were actually necessitated by the demands of
articles of faith. The instance of this which was most prominent on philosophical minds was the
theoretical implications which had accumulated in the schools concerning the Council of Trent’s
ruling on the metaphysics of the Eucharist. Theologians “interpreted the Tridentine formula as if
it had endorsed a theory of [Aristotelian] substances and accidents,” particularly one which
allowed the full gamut of properties of something to remain unchanged, (seeming like bread,
the experience of it being wine) yet nevertheless for the thing-itself to become different
(genuinely divine body, actually miraculous blood).111 It was explained that the manifest
properties were inessential to the nature of the substance, rendering appearances and things
theoretically autonomous. “Manifest” is used here as a scholastic technical term, the opposite of
which was occult, describing properties which definitionally were in no way evident.112 The
evolution of this concept under Cartesian use is a central indication of their collective impulse to
minimize theoretical vulnerability.
True to seventeenth century form, this project of inventing science was surrounded by
and engaged with a complicated ideological terrain of spiritual innovation and monastic
initiatives, such that formative roles were played by the Jesuits, Oratorians, Benedictines, and
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even Cistercians of a radicalized abbey in Paris. The Jesuits were a relatively new order
dedicated to a positive, politicized and polemical program of “traditionalist pedagogy,” and the
Oratorians were exactly their opposite.113 Both viewed their central work to be education, but
whereas the Jesuits were concerned with delineating deviance, which in this context meant
drawing out theoretical similarities to the Protestant heresy of John Calvin or the rationalist
monist heresy of Baruch Spinoza, the Oratorians were interested in teaching the new
developments in mathematics and philosophy in the growing number of colleges they controlled.
Founded that very century, the Oratorians rejected structural constraints of many kinds, including
the scholasticism of the Jesuits and even the taking of vows.114 These were the two institutions
operating the largest share of the private colleges in which philosophical education took place,
(as opposed to the increasingly detached and authoritative universities) and both orders
necessarily forbade teaching Descartes.115 But while Oratorian professors got away with doing so
anyway, Jesuits who so much as dabbled were sent away on missionary work.116 The most
radicalized Jesuit college was Descartes alma mater La Flèche, which certainly had something to
do with the relationship enshrined by the Henriade.117 The third major player was the neoAugustinian movement known as Jansenism. Inspired by a posthumous work titled Augustinus,
published the same year as Descartes’ Meditations, it was in many interesting ways the ethicalexistential counterpart to Cartesian ontology and epistemology, including its clandestine
following.118 It was the Cartesians who were seen as sharing a “belief in the authority of human
reason” with the Jansenists and not the other way around, and indeed, the theoretical possibility
113
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of legitimate civil disobedience was unavoidable for them, while Descartes avoided it just fine.119
The view was that salvation is not itself a choice, as the Jesuits maintained, but irresistible for
those who have achieved it; while not immediately intuitive as a promotion for the reasoning
subject, what Jansen offered was a theory of agency which located the intervention of divine
grace ontologically prior to, or beyond the jurisdiction of, rationality and will in a way that cast
human freedom in an entirely different light. In many regards it was yet another subversive
theological movement which emphasized transformative election is the context of theories
questioning the possibility of authorities of any kind to come before God, with the particular
epistemological emphasis on “the human spirit’s efforts to decide which facts to believe” being a
reflection of the concerns of the day.120 The movement was centered on Port-Royal Abbey in
Paris, which was forcefully evicted in 1709.121 The male Jansenists at Port-Royal were called
“solitaires,” among whom Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole were also prominent Cartesians.122
The overwhelming complexity and long term of the scandal is attributable to the political
maneuvering between king and pope in that period, such that when Jansenism was mutually
targeted it was as a show of solidarity, despite the fact that “the Papacy and the king [did so] for
different reasons.”123 What matters is that this movement was so closely associated with
Cartesianism (for reasons both ideological and circumstantial) that, especially during the decade
from 1669 when Clement IX commanded critique of Jansenism to stop to when that policy had
effectively eroded, “an anti-Jansenist animus” was expressed through attacks on Cartesianism.124
They were bound together by the controversy over the Eucharist.
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The scholastic tradition, so-called historically in reference to its authoritative position in
the schools, understood thinking and learning in terms of logical principles of formalized
inference, particularly syllogism. Descartes felt the common dissatisfaction with such a
preoccupation, to the effect that syllogistic logic is merely a standardized form for expressing
what one already knows.125 And while he was certainly on to something, it was his interest in
expressing something new which cast such inferential discourses in a negative light. The
scholastic curriculum included no such method of discovery beyond the bounds of what was
already affirmed as true, and certainly made no pretense to ever operate in the absence of
established fact. This epistemological contrariety, along with the legal authority delegated to the
Sorbonne regarding the matter, is no doubt what led Descartes to dedicate Meditations on First
Philosophy to the same Faculty in 1641, and bearing the subtitle “in which the existence of God
and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated.” He affirms his fear of God on all counts, but
also sees his position as sufficiently weak as to necessitate the somewhat ludicrous cover story
that it is his aim to convince the faithless of God’s existence, because the faith-based “argument
cannot be put to unbelievers because they would judge it to be circular.”126 Despite his
demonstrations of proper spiritual socialization and the excuse of validating divine truth by
“philosophy rather than theology,” Descartes’ work did not receive the approval he requested.127
It was not until 1663, thirteen years after their author’s death and two after Louis XIV
assumed full rule of France, that the Church in Rome put Descartes’ works on the Index of
Prohibited Books.128 While this means that all good Catholics were under moral obligation to
avoid any contact with the central texts of Cartesianism, the fact that they were not subsequently
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censored under French law presented an ambiguous situation which only became more so. In the
decades to come, the power to suppress discourse and compel cultural norms was enacted
variously by the ecclesiastical, monastic, and monarchical institutions which held it, but never in
a way which was total. Cartesians were not hounded or drawn out of hiding; the extent of their
vulnerability was elective. Two periods of escalating repercussions (the first from 1671-72 and
the latter 1689-92) culminated in the king directing the University of Paris to condemn the
teaching of certain Cartesian ideas.129 These controversies found Robert Desgabets and
respectively, his colleague Pierre Sylvain Régis, the sub-tradition composed of whom Tad M.
Schmaltz characterizes as “radical Cartesianism,” as the primary recipients of official censure.130
These affairs and the vast political consequences of indiscretion by Cartesians will be discussed
in connection with the progression towards institutional legitimacy.
While the theological basis for political legitimacy remained grounded in the
presumption of the truth of university dogma, Louis XIV and his finance minister Jean-Baptiste
Colbert had become aware of the potential for power which lay in the new mode of inquiry. It
was with the aim of encouraging “technologically productive” works, particularly those with
economic or military applications, and in so doing accruing glory to the king, that the French
Royal Academy of Sciences was founded in 1666.131 This first generation of the Academy was
given no legal basis and instead relied on maintaining a close relationship of patronage within
Colbert's inner circle. Two of his parlementarian subordinates started printing the Journal des
sçavans in 1665, and of whom it was Jean Gallois who gained control of it in 1666 and was
brought into a leadership position in the Academy by Colbert two years later.132 It was in that
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way that sçavans became the closest thing the early Academy had to an official periodical,
despite never being bound by any institutional connection.133
Colbert's strategy was to allow neither Cartesians, nor partisans of scholasticism. In his
attempts to create an uncontroversial academy, he took his inspiration from an unofficial Parisian
academy which was formalized by Habert de Montmor and later reformed around Melchisédech
Thévenot, who held themselves to “separating science as much as possible from metaphysical
and religious controversies.”134 This was quite a demand, given that the central metaphysical
dispute in question concerned the nature and feasibility of scientific knowledge in the first place,
and that the disputing parties were institutional religion and quasi-heretics. The value of tactful
silence was paramount and unmistakable. For while open Cartesians were indeed excluded in
1666, some of the most notable inductees of that first cohort, such as Christiaan Huygens and
Claude Perrault were disciples of Descartes in all but name, adopting everything from his
rationalist method and perspective to his vortical physics as integral parts of their own work.135
By the time of the 1699 reforms to the Academy the exclusion of Cartesians could hardly have
been of much concern if Nicolas Malebranche was welcome, for he was the central figure of the
explicitly Cartesian project of natural philosophy by that time.136 As long as the metaphysical
basis of institutional French science remained Cartesian, it did so under the Malebranchean
interpretation (albeit varying by degree.) A look at how this came to be, despite the initial
rejection of Malebranche’s theory of “ideas in God” by many of those properly called Cartesians,
will follow a portrait of the values and expectations that characterized that community. 137
the social occasion
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Despite both death and hellfire being established as possible consequences, there were a
handful of outright Cartesians in France. They were the ones who, not merely engaging in
rationalist foundationalist studies of a mechanical natural world to the extent which characterizes
the implicit Cartesianism of many savants, took it upon themselves to further develop a
philosophical understanding of what constitutes justified true belief and how to get it. This
entailed dialectical difference of opinion with the ontological accounts of both Renaissance
naturalism and that which was maintained in the universities. Their explicit rejection of intimate
access to objects disavowed them of the mystified epistemological resources of the former, while
their polemical rejection of the latter “outmoded and intellectually disgraced authoritarian
tradition” gave definition to the social situation of their own movement by contrast;
unfortunately this meant that their defining feature was being unauthoritative, having burned all
(nominal) bridges with “received wisdom.”138 Typically called Cartesian skepticism, the central
rhetorical lever which the Cartesian discourse had available is more technically “negative
dogmatism,” the view that the unproven must be denied.139 This all-purpose critique was never
enforced universally by Descartes in his own writing, and that ambiguity was maintained by his
students. It was the discursive manifestation of the incommensurability of the cogito with
physicality, and complicated Cartesian claims to knowledge just as well as it undermined those
of the “partisans of school philosophy.”140 This forced an extensive relationship with the
hypothesis, which at the time meant an unmethodical and unproven explanation of a set of
phenomena, grounded only in rational conception; they found themselves stuck with a
heightened knowledge of the inadequacy of such claims, but lacking significant insight into how
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to meet their own high standards.141 Most of what they did accept were extensions and
clarifications of Descartes’ original principles, showing particular interest in delineating between
what one should reasonably be expected to know, what was inaccessible, and concerning what it
was appropriate to guess. The doctrine of occasionalism, the anti-occult attitude, and the
discursive isolation of physics from mechanics together reveal a restrictive proceduralization of
thought, as a socially explicable protective measure. That is to say, the central normative value of
the early modern urban elite, namely honorable sociability, was served in this context of political
marginalization paired with the lack of an actionable program to their benefit by the
minimization of the epistemological burden on the individual, while simultaneously wielding
that vulnerability against the authority of the schools to the extent that it was prudent.
Conversely, “increasing one’s credibility by enhancing one’s social status” was important for
anyone working at the metaphysical fringe who took the possibility of widespread appeal
seriously.142
The most fitting date by which to mark the start of Cartesianism as identifying a
community rather than just a set of ideas is 1659.143 This was when Jacques Rohault, a
mathematician from a wealthy merchant family, began hosting what are known in the
anglophone literature as his “Wednesday conferences,” opening his Paris home in the middle of
every week until his death in 1672.144 They were so emblematic of the rationalist spirit in France
that historian of the Academy (which is to say, not a Descartes scholar) Roger Hahn presents the
very same early modern period which ended violently at the Bastille as having begun
comfortably at Rohault's house.145 This weekly get-together, which its attendees enigmatically
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referred to as les mercredis des Rohault, and which established him as the “foremost proponent”
of Cartesian philosophy, can be called the seat of Cartesian legitimacy for multiple reasons.146
Presenting “from the general principles of Cartesian physics,” to how they “provide explanations
of various natural phenomena” and culminating in “experiments which confirmed the results,”
Rohault set the standard of tone and style for the Cartesian project; however, to say he
established the theoretical orthodoxy as well would be an overstatement, for he cautiously left all
of the original conceptual ambiguities intact.147 His primary philosophical contribution, which
would persist as the less-than-appealing fallback position, was to “jettison much of Descartes’s
metaphysical baggage” at the outset by endorsing a probabilistic function for hypothetical
claims.148 This willingness of the more physical than metaphysical Cartesians to turn the page on
the foundational stage of the project (before it was finished, no less) made up the background to
the positive extensions of doctrine to come, and indeed, it was the wisest course of action given
the politico-spiritual demands on them all. Nevertheless, Rohault's role in the “propagation of the
new philosophy” was crucial as the first steps towards the normalized presence of nonAristotelian thought and theoretical discourse in French society. 149 But this is not to say that his
mercrediste clique was allowed to pursue their agenda in peace.
Claude Clerselier, the lawyer at the parlement of Paris who translated and published the
official French Meditations in 1647 and remained in charge of the publication of Descartes’
correspondences and unfinished works, was also Rohault’s father-in-law.150 Clerselier not only
frequented les mercredis but was sufficiently involved in them to be identified as co-host by the
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Archbishop of Paris in 1671, when he reprimanded the two men on behalf of the king as well as
his bishopric.151 Just as Clerselier was kept close to the action by means of the bond of his
daughter’s marriage, he had been connected to it in the first place by way of his own. A both
professional and familial relationship with brother-in-law Hector-Pierre Chanut, the nordophile
who put Descartes in touch with Queen Christina of Sweden and who persuaded him to accept an
invitation to her court at Stockholm in December 1649, meant that back in Paris, Clerselier was
the lucky recipient of the philosopher’s invaluable literary estate when Descartes died promptly
in February.152 In grounding the general patterns in this period of close social relations between
the intellectual and traditional elites, as well as the patriarchal emphasis placed on dynastic
bonds, it is revealing and straightforward that possession of Descartes’ manuscripts passed
directly from the monarch of a European power to a man whom Rohault would have considered
his uncle, and from there to his immediate (née Clerselier) family in Paris (in material terms this
connection became far less straightforward when the ship from Sweden sank and Clerselier had
to hire divers to recover the soaked manuscripts.)153
Other noteworthy mercredistes included Malebranche, Nicolas Poisson and Barnard
Lamy, all three of whom were Oratorians, Huygens, Gerauld de Cordemoy, a parliamentarian
with sympathies for Gassendist materialism, the disputatious Simon Foucher, the controversial
Benedictine Robert Desgabets and his student Pierre Sylvain Régis, who was also “Rohault’s
most outstanding protégé,” inheriting nominal leadership of the Wednesdays after Rohault’s
death.154 All but one of the men instrumental to the development of Descartes’ system attended
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these meetings.155 Rohault’s socio-economic resources allowed a space for key figures to identify
with one another in a setting of domestic hospitality, legitimated by the co-host’s relationship to
the master himself; and while discord within this group was as inevitable as Cartesian
epistemology was ambiguous, there is no indication that Rohault’s Wednesdays were anything
less than serene occasions. An unmistakably elite crowd, the mercredistes were not only well-todo but “interacted socially and professionally” with those sympathetic to their cause within the
Academy after 1666.156 Their subsequent discourse certainly would not have been such a tightknit (and thus historically comprehensible) affair if there had not been a de facto Cartesian
Society to which it could be endemic, with an uncontroversial “arbiter of Cartesian scientific
affairs” at its head.157 In regards to the exclusionary interpersonal considerations developed in
part one, it was exactly the sort of situation which allowed two guarded res cogitans to see eyeto-eye.
Or at least they would have, if the metaphysical concern at hand had not precluded seeing
eye-to-anything.158 As the situation stood at time of the inception of the Academy, the grounds
for scientific knowledge was still an open question which fell on the shoulders of the individual.
But by the 1699 reformation, two positive programs had been developed, forwarded, and
weathered the storm of reception. The first was occasionalist Cartesianism, an idealist
interpretation which was championed by Malebranche, and which was undermined from the start
by its similarities to Jansenism. The second was intentionalist Cartesianism, an insightfully
modern phenomenal realism which found its most palatable expression under Régis; this is the
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position Schmaltz calls “Radical Cartesianism,” which was developed by Desgabets and
struggled under his inability to avoid public controversy.159
It is unclear to what extent Jansenism inspired the Cartesian concept of occasional
causation, but the notion of God as the one true “efficient” power was definitely theirs first.160
The idea is that whenever one wills to act, (particularly to serve) this comes about as something
caused by God. As an expression of His love, God makes reality reflect the activities of
humanity; when one does, it is by God that it is done. This line of thinking is of clear relevance
to all Cartesians, who were flummoxed by the prospect of mind-body interaction. Further, in the
course of the journey out of his famed radical doubt in Meditations, Descartes argues that
because “all things depend upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver,” it can be concluded “that
the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God.”161 By
understanding what it means for God exist, (which itself follows from understanding what it
means to be God at all) Descartes explains that divine grace alone is the reason that one can trust
perceptions to have anything to do with reality. For their to be a reality but for experience not to
track that reality whatsoever would be cruel; this is the extent of Descartes’ metaphysical role for
God in that work, as he goes on to argue from distinct ideas of entities which have been validated
only indistinctly. However, evidence from his letters has been used to present the compelling
argument that his occasionalism extended even further.162 But in the era of secular “brain-in-avat” updates to Descartes’ worries, his reality-in-God argument is cast aside, perhaps fairly;
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however, the speculation that Descartes and his contemporaries would not have been genuinely
convinced by such as argument is far less so. Indeed, occasionalism was precisely the attempt to
further rely on this metaphysical role of God.
The single creatively influential Cartesian who did not attend the Wednesday’s had the
distinction of working even more closely with Descartes than Clerselier. Not only a graduate
from La Flèche, Louis de La Forge had the honor of editing and completing Descartes’
appropriately bipartite account of body and soul.163 The first volume Descartes had written under
the title Traité de l’homme, which La Forge expanded and illustrated; Clerselier wrote in the
preface that La Forge, as a Cartesian medical doctor, had the unusual combination of
philosophical and anatomical skills necessary for the job. The second volume Descartes had not
written, so La Forge (rather boldly) projected a work of his own, Traité de l’esprit, as a
substitute, publishing them in 1664 and 1666 respectively.164 If there is any disagreement in the
historical literature on Cartesianism, it concerns the identity of the orthodox position and how
occasionalism factors in. However, none deny the orthodoxy of La Forge; even Richard Watson,
whose historiography positions occasionalism and orthodoxy as opposites, claims the orthodoxy
of La Forge while acknowledging that he was “at least in conversation, a complete
occasionalist.”165 Indeed this unique unanimity is best explained by the fact that none of the
historical participants questioned his credentials either. By completing Descartes unfinished
project, he had the strongest claim to being his intellectual heir, winning a respect for his work
which continues to shape the representation of its content. The only other uncontroversial
Cartesian text would be Rohault’s Traité de physique, published the year of his censure.166
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Given that the aim of science is knowing and not doing, the context for discussing
occasionalism will be restricted to “body-mind causation.”167 The evidence for Jansenist
similarities and the brief depiction paragraphs above regards the opposite, the capacity of
thoughts like willing to bear some kind of directive relation to the corporeal human body. While
La Forge took a principled stand on the occasional account in those regards also, the thrust of the
Cartesian venture was not at stake.168 And indeed, the asymmetrical relationship between res
cogitans and res extensa meant that the receptivity of the body to (entirely commonplace)
impingement by the mind was no less evident than its existence in the first place; the mind can at
very least compare what it tries to do with what happens.169 Body-mind causation, on the other
hand, necessarily involves events off-screen. It also involves more than just the fleshly human
body, which Descartes was convinced came to a point of contact with immaterial consciousness
at the pineal gland, such that locomotive thought produced a characteristic wiggling, while
different wigglings produced feelings.170 This bizarre neuro-existential doctrine appeared in his
last work, the 1649 Passions of the Soul and had little impact on the epistemological discussion
as it applied to the objects of natural science. La Forge actively downplayed the master’s late,
reconciliatory pivot to anatomy by indicating in a footnote that the way the word idea was used,
ambiguously and in the context of the machinations of the pineal omphalos, is simply an instance
of homophony, and not the shocking deathbed recantation of the regretful res cogitans.171 The
novel usage which indicates “the way in which the [animal] spirits emerge from the gland” is
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then replaced by the term “espèces corporelles” in l’esprit.172 Rebecca Wilkins notes that the
images which La Forge was commissioned to produce are sterile, non-naturalistic evocations of
the mechanically reductive human body, especially in comparison to those accompanying an
unofficial Latin printing two years earlier.173 Taking these ideas more seriously would have
entailed a direct physical realism as far as perceptual experience is concerned, without any
possibility for the methodological intervention of the cogito (at least until the tremors of the
pineal gland were decoded.) This is to say, perception would be readily explicable as the
phenomenon triggered by specific events in the eye, and understanding of that phenomenon
would likewise consist in part of the state of the brain nearby. The exhaustive mechanical
description of nature which was the pursuit of most of the Cartesians and certainly the merely de
facto ones, (Rohault was archetypal) required there be only one axis of ambiguity between the
relationship of phenomena to reality and the consciousness of those phenomena which seeks to
represent the relationship between them. It was La Forge’s argument that “an external stimulus
on sensory organs… is not, properly speaking, a sensation at all.”174 This was quite true within
the parameters Descartes had established in his earlier works, and clears the air for another
account of correspondence.
It was in the context of this desire for methodological certainty that La Forge emphasized
the “divine arrangement” that the Supreme Being maintains between stimulus and experience,
such that the former lacks a causal role and is instead only an occasion for God to produce the
latter.175 Indeed, God was said to be the efficacy in all motions and changes of physical things as
well, even if they weren’t in a position to occasion an eye-stimulus which was in turn an
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occasion for a perception. While strange especially to the secular imagination, occasionalism was
a way of honoring the fact that material entities themselves are very different ontologically from
perceptual experiences of them. The idea of a thing is not itself that thing, nor is it a fainter
manifestation of it. There is no “rapport” between the two, but both are creatures under the same
God. By denying that appearances are in the business of representing objects, occasionalism
made a paradoxical sort of progress towards a method of deriving necessary truth from
phenomena, as the relationship between the two had finally been represented in terms of absolute
being. However, this is also the context in which probabilistic, hypothetical representations
became necessary. First utilized by La Forge and then endorsed by Rohault in his 1671 book,
hypothetical explanations require that “causes conjectured are established as true by the fact that
they are capable of explaining the observed phenomena.”176 This is much how science would
proceed in later generations. But these Cartesians were far more concerned with the full
ontological implications of their claims than subsequent scientists would be, and occasionalism
was there to alleviate much of this anxiety. Guessing about the reasons behind natural
phenomena is less of a high-stake activity if it is already established that technically, in the most
proper sense, God is the reason. Thus the task of interpreting the relations between mere
appearances is nothing more than that. The real and independent existence of res extensa was
bracketed and accounted for as a conceptual totality, with the divine promise that its truth was
somehow implicated in a satisfying way by the subsequently safe conversations concerning
appearances. Given the situation of the active policing of metaphysical principles from which the
development and success of occasionalism emerged, its central claim having the direct effect of
undercutting the very possibility of rational truth-claims carrying political or theological
implications is strikingly evocative of Descartes’ promise in Discourse on Method to reject on
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principle the enactment of any philosophies, programs or autonomous rationalities which
antagonize the order of power. The historical Cartesian movement was bound between these
reciprocal promises, one from God to cogito that his descriptions matter, and the other from
cogito to God’s representatives on earth that his descriptions don’t matter too much.
Taken for the capacity in which it functioned as a strategic response to the socio-political
burden of the new epistemology which required the individual to take a stand, occasionalism was
ingenious. The pretense of the possibility of certainty which justified the whole project was
maintained, while the responsibilities of the claimant were scaled back to the limits of his
experience. Faith, which had been the radical lack of absolute control which had once cast the
natural world “as a vast phantasmagory of psychic forces,” was reimagined as quite the opposite:
it became a doctrinal cashing-in on the universally attested greatness of God in order to control
for a mystery of human existence which couldn’t be worked out from the system by conventional
means. It was a philosophical equivalent of the way in which the monarchy grounded its
authority in the Divinity; occasionalism gives a collective benefit of the doubt against the
likelihood that all perceptions are hallucinations, just as the elaborate legal and ecclesiastical
system ruling France all implicated the same transcendental justification. The idea that early
modern philosophies such as that introduced by Descartes associated “masculinity with a
cleaner, purer, more objective and more disciplined epistemological relation to the world” is well
established in at least a broad sense.177 Insofar as this characterizes the cultural turn which Susan
Bordo calls “the Cartesian masculinization of thought,” occasionalism was a further development
of that trend.178 It must also be noted that it was specifically the masculine, dualistic rigor which
brought with it a heightened vulnerability of man before his peers and the anxious politics of
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managing his stature which is explored here, and which was managed with further separateness;
while the shame at being wrong is longstanding, the explicit possibility of having one’s status as
truth-attuned, autonomous rationality revoked is of Descartes’ design. Before further discussion
of the maturing sensibilities of the Cartesians, the contemporary philosophical mode which
represented everything they rejected must be explored briefly to further inform their meaning of
the word occult.
intimacy and secret keeping
The primordial epistemology which Bordo identifies with characterizations of “feminine
consciousness,” and which takes “sympathy” as the means of knowing, figures as a prologue to
the story of scientific worldviews, identified as Renaissance naturalism.179 Understanding in this
idiom meant “granting personal or intuitive response a positive epistemological value,” in such a
way that “allows the variety of its meanings to unfold without coercion or too-focused
interrogation.”180 This sort of approach was taken to scientific study, which consisted of
observing the sympathies and antipathies of “the occult forces of nature.”181 It was thought that
reason, so beloved by the Cartesians, merely “dwells on the surface”; the mind must instead “be
drawn down into the deep,” such that understanding becomes “the form of the things
intelligible… [and] for a moment is made (as it were) the intelligible thing itself.” The same
objects which are so remote from Cartesian apprehension “seem to talk without words.”182 As an
account of the phenomenon of understanding this is less strange than it at first appears, and
indeed looks very much like an overexcited rediscovery of Plato. As an approach to systematic,
reductive delineation of necessary features of the world it leaves a good deal to be desired, and
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seems to have allowed a healthy bit of whimsy into the thought of Jan Baptist van Helmont, the
last major proponent to be publishing throughout Descartes’ life, who explained that blood of the
slain “boils in rage” in the presence of the murderer.183 There was none of the same trepidation
over being proven wrong, (a creative guy like van Helmont must have been called out plenty)
nor the same opposition between an independent, comprehensive appreciation of all phenomena
on the one hand, and the “lifeless field [consisting of] only the brute blows of inert chunks of
matter,” or res extensa, on the other.184 Not only were points of contact between the material and
the spiritual not restricted to the pineal gland, they were everywhere.
How would someone be perceived who explains the world in such necrotic terms, and
who claims such unassailable mastery for themselves? In the 1693 Jesuit commentary Nouvelles
difficultez, the devitalization on one side and the perception of a certain arrogance on the other
again seem to be connected, when the disrespect of denying animals souls is explained through a
body-swap story in which a dog is baffled by the “unintelligible chatter of philosophers.”185
Cartesians who were more sensitive to the shame involved allowed the presence of a vital
principle in animals, (most notable of these was Fontenelle, no doubt in relation to his
scrutinized position within the Academy) but those who remained adamant mechanists did so on
principle of their broader rejection of substantial forms, the Aristotelian concept allowing there
to be any qualities endemic to bodies themselves.186 This included the human soul, and
Cartesians were seen as rejecting those as well, which Descartes denied on the basis of the
dogmatic truth of its immortality. 187 This wasn’t just getting drawn into the theology of the
Eucharist on a technicality, it was a flat-out denial of the very human embodiment which God on
183

Ibid.,.
Ibid., 31.
185
Clarke, Occult Powers, 27.
186
Ibid., 28.
187
Ibid., 25.
184

58

earth exemplifies! Of course this was embarrassing, as well as illegal. Secret-keeping would be
necessary from the start, and someone who understood the principles of Cartesian metaphysics
well enough would be hard to convince that it didn’t violate the miracle of transubstantiation.
Descartes understood well the value of remaining silent on controversial issues, for
sometimes it is the only way to avoid either attesting something which is contradictory to reason
or to embarrass oneself. This is best exemplified by his correspondence with Denis Mesland, the
Jesuit teacher at La Flèche who was later exiled for engaging with the rationalist. In 1644, when
a sympathetic Mesland contacted Descartes asking for his account of transubstantiation, he
refused, citing his lack of authority on the matter.188 This was wise, but Descartes seems to have
thought that to have refused a second time would be too great an indication that he could not
produce one. Thus is the anxious position of hiding from scandal in plain sight, for when he
finally did explain his view of the Eucharist, it was highly idiosyncratic. In explaining the “Real
Presence” of God in the bread, Descartes also had to introduce a distinction between the general
res extensa sense of “body” and that of the human body, “the whole of the matter united to the
soul of that man”; because in Cartesian metaphysics no living thing truly inhabits space and no
ontological distinctions between organic and inorganic bodies are proper to res extensa, this was
undoubtedly a less-than-desirable conceptual division.189 He used this novelty to explain what he
claimed to understand as the everyday phenomenon of “natural transubstantiation,” by which
food which is digested is incorporated into the substance of the body (in the new second sense);
only at that point could miraculous transubstantiation be described as that which occurs when
“the bread and wine become part of Christ’s matter without mixing with… His heavenly
body.”190 Without admitting error of any kind, Descartes nevertheless asked Mesland not to share
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this view, or if he did, to “not attribute its authorship.”191 This is a brilliantly clear precedent for
the narrow path that his followers would have to walk in order to balance their various
conflicting responsibilities. When in 1648 Descartes discovered that Mesland had let his secret
slip, in the form of a letter from Port-Royalist Antoine Arnauld containing the pointed request
that he clarify his view, Descartes wrote back suggesting that they discuss it in person. Arnauld
reiterated his request for a clarification by letter, to which Descartes made no response. That he
shared so little information with the curious Arnauld is indeed best understood as “prudence…
rather than a change of mind” from the position he shared with Mesland, with whom he
remained consistent.192 This episode shows a number of the practical features of the imageconscious moderation of the socially-inscribed mind-body interface. From the first, there is none
of the implicit trust entailed by a mutual, dialectical mode. Exposure of sensitive opinions is
weighed as a liability, and Descartes doubtlessly saw his confidence in Mesland as a mistake. An
awareness of the far higher stakes of the written word is also evident in his exchange with
Arnauld. It is also clear that, in weighing his options, Descartes recognized how much less he
stood to lose from ignoring the Jansenist (not yet as controversial as they would become, but
still) than from letting a skilled theologian draw out the most heretical implications of his
thought.
The choice of Cartesian dualism as a metaphysical program is necessarily the rejection of
intimacy in epistemology in favor of a radicalized regime of descriptive authority, and the
subsequent avoidance of a kind of personal intimacy insofar as it entails intellectual
vulnerability. By rejecting the metaphysical basis for an implicit understanding of objects, reality
is reduced to appearances, or more specifically, the subject’s account of them. That description is
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always open to testing, or inspection for signs of deceit. Dualism likewise prevents an implicit
understanding of character, as it entails a constant conscious moderation of appearances. The
doctrine endorsed by La Forge and Rohault is that perceptions never represent their occasion,
such that when the occasion is the phenomenon of another person, their thoughts and feelings
are doubly hidden: first behind the existential and causal irrelevance of all apparent objects, and
then behind the absence of anything like selfhood from both those appearances and res extensa.
This structural isolation should continue to inform consideration of the social position successful
Cartesians took up as secretive outsiders who bide their time, minimizing relations which were
not on the basis of reciprocal factionalism, leaving broader implications unsaid, and above all
else, the opportunistic criticism of those who made use of intellectual resources which Cartesian
dualists had so recently begun to deny themselves.
The uncooperative and uncompromising structural tendencies of Cartesian metaphysics,
particularly as situated within a socio-political regime which demanded credulity, is best
understood through the lens of their anti-occultism. It was most properly a concern of the
mechanists, whose explanatory apparatus was exceptionally bare.193 They were essentially
limited to analysis of bodies given (as occasions for) experience and the causal relations between
them, a simple theory which was nevertheless on uncertain metaphysical footing. Just as res
extensa and res cogitans lacked rapport, or interaction, so too did the components of a two-body
interactions. This was again a means of avoiding overstepping the strict theoretical bounds of
dual substantialism by regarding any claims about the affairs of material things as being
unfounded, even beyond the issue of representation itself. By analogy to modern tendencies in
the discourses of analytic philosphy, the anti-occultist attitude was the favorite rhetorical lever
which came with the ontological minimalism of reductive physical theories, to be used
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opportunistically to disrupt realist positions. And equally like the course pursued by advocates of
overly-simplistic metaphysical systems of the modern era, French Cartesians sought to grow the
descriptive power of their position in the direction of a functional quasi-realism, all the while
mocking the attempt to develop realist theories. Due to his job of navigating and contextualizing
the variety of theoretical accounts after the turn of the century, Fontenelle stands out as having
made the most explicit case for a quasi-realist Cartesian metaphysics of science, writing
enthusiastically non-confrontational niceties such as, “if physics can never achieve the exactitude
of mathematics, it can at least imitate the order of it!”194 It should be noted that this was in
response to their being some who believed physics could achieve such precision. This phrase in
particular makes far more sense as a political ultimatum, arguing that while one may not
advocate for a realist picture of mathematical representation, but that there is nevertheless room
to practice physics, with the same effect as though it were descriptive of reality. This approach
was grounded in the unique Malebranchean occasionalism.
the social intention
Jacques Rohault took up La Forge’s occasionalism, and without reiterating its
controversial metaphysics, turned its full polemical force against the scholastic tradition,
attacking their view of “sensations as qualities in the objects.”195 Scholastic discourse was easier
to criticize than ever as an occasionalist, and it was certainly less daunting of a task than further
interpreting and grounding truth within that metaphysical scheme and publishing generalized
claims on that basis. Following the trajectory of occasionalism through by further merging
ontology and divinity would be Malebranche’s contribution, resolving questions of the mind’s
access to truth but doing so in a way that was widely disputed by his colleagues. However, this
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would occur in a context of heightened peril for those labelled Cartesians as compared to the
decade of the 1660s, thanks largely to the social conduct of Robert Desgabets.
Descartes had expressed in no uncertain terms that stuff and the awareness of it are
fundamentally different, but was ill equipped to put them back together, citing God just for proof
that they do at all. As his pineal convictions show, as well as the continued theorization
regarding “ideas of,” differentiated only on a spectrum of clarity, Descartes’ theory of mind
never reflected the dramatic reorientation that his dualism necessitated.196 This is to say that
using the phrase “idea of x” takes care to indicate a feature of consciousness and not x itself, but
that it does so in an unsophisticated way that problematizes neither the complexities of the
relationship between x and some speculative, material referent, nor any profound sense of how
the idea in question might function within a conscious experience that characteristically has no
access to x.197 Thus Cartesians were left little in the way of a common vocabulary with which to
begin to assemble a positive epistemology. Occasionalism articulated a break from responsibility
for the expression of states of being foreign to the mind (ideas being of anything at all) in such a
way that still allowed productive conversations correlating successive appearances, but was
immediately faced with the question of where such appearances do come from, if not their
occasional cause directly, as well as the contrasting question of whether hypotheses can be
certain. This theory systematically solved the problem of whether or not “external” objects of
consciousness exist at all with a general no. Desgabet differed completely in regards to
interpreting the “idea of” relation, and rejected major components of Descartes’ ontology in the
process.198 This is to say he embraced a universal yes.
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When Desgabet wrote that “it suffices to think of a thing… to have a demonstrative proof
of its existence” in his unpublished 1675 Supplément à la philosophie de M. Descartes, it is clear
that he is not using “existence” to mean a particular instance of res extensa as Descartes had.199
Instead he meant to indicate that on a fundamental level, the res cogitans is not subject to
falsifiability. When the mind perceives a state of affairs, there is a kind of autonomy to what is
seen as well as what does the seeing; whether or not what seems to be seen is later judged to
have been somehow inaccurate cannot undo this. He characterized Descartes, in contrast, as
holding the view that “thought is equally thought, whether it has for an object being or
nothingness.” This reasonable difference of opinion from Descartes motivates him to reject the
negative dogmatic method entirely.200
This description of thought as exhibiting “intentionality,” or as necessarily being oriented
towards some object of that consciousness which can be stated positively as such, constituted a
major step forward at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to that extent it is a
mischaracterization when Schmaltz describes Desgabet’s work as “antimodern.”201 But if it is
taken to mean regressive, or that Desgabets used intentionality to reestablish a direct realism
which he saw as in agreement with the perceptual claims of the scholastics, then it is perhaps
more fitting.202 Judgement of the modernity of his view is far too bound up in what could be said
with the vocabulary he had at his disposal, as claims in terms of unqualified “sensations and
ideas” appear to entail the existence of “external things” which are definitionally beyond
apprehension, to both the reader today and Desgabet’s contemporaries.203 The boldness required
to turn against the occasionalist tide in asserting that the same principle which demonstrates the
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existence of God does the same for objects should not go unnoted, given that it required standing
against the legacy of Descartes himself.204
While by no means a bad philosopher, Desgabets was a disastrous publicist and
negotiator. He showed quite the knack for endorsing disadvantageous positions, and on multiple
occasions an expression of support for the work of a fellow Cartesian was met with public
denunciation. Clearly there was something beyond the idiosyncrasies of his thought that repulsed
his contemporaries, although perhaps the distinction should not be drawn with such finality. Just
as La Forge, Desgabets had intimate access to the intellectual estate of Descartes in the years
immediately after his death through association with Clerselier.205 But whereas La Forge utilized
the immense consensus-shaping power of this position to tactfully secure an especially palatable
interpretation of the master’s thought at the crucial moment prior to the development of an
orthodoxy, Desgabets did the exact opposite, seizing on the least palatable aspect of Descartes’
thought. Clerselier had chosen not to print Descartes’ correspondence with Mesland in order to
avoid the “publicly sensitive issue of eucharistic transubstantiation,” and probably immediately
regretted not doing more to keep it quiet, specifically keeping it secret from Desgabets, when he
received soon thereafter a letter expressing the indignation of two doctors that Descartes and
Cartesians would ever think such a thing.206 Clerselier deferred the responsibility for formulating
a response to his Benedictine friend who had first made light of the issue, whose testimony he
couched in Desgabets’ stature as a “good religious”; when in 1667 he received another, this time
from Poisson, an Oratorian attendee of the Wedsnesdays, charging heresy, he again deferred to
Desgabets on the same basis.207 So in a sense it can be said Clerselier “drew Desgabets into
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battles” on the Eucharist, but it would be more fair to say that Desgabets had it coming,
especially after he defended the contra Mesland account in both cases.208 Clerselier was not a
priest, and seems to have confused Desgabets’ confidence and learning for a well-habituated
awareness of what it is extremely imprudent to say. And indeed, Desgabets seemed entirely
comfortable discussing the subject, admitting that he had been having innovative thoughts on the
matter since before encountering Descartes’ account.209 As his stature as a Cartesian grew he
continued to associate with and endorse the contra Mesland account which Descartes’ himself
hoped would never see the light of day, but which Desgabets was now pushing Clerselier to have
published.210. In fact, when he went on to develop a doctrine of the “indestructibility of matter”
which further alienated from the Cartesian mainstream, he presented it as a defense of the
Thomist account of the Eucharist and against the Scotist one, the two leading legitimate accounts
of transubstantiation within contemporary scholasticism.211 This is roughly the beginning of
Desgabets’ efforts to not only not avoid the metaphysical scandal which everyone else seemed to
realize could easily ruin a career, but to actively entangle it with every other relevant taboo. In
1670, after receiving a letter in which the Jansenist Arnauld expresses his worry that the contra
Mesland account was heretical, Desgabets met with the thinkers of Port-Royal, accompanied by
the “procurer general” of his order.212 Both expressed dismay at his continued rejection of long
standing theological tradition, with Arnauld emphasizing how close the contra Mesland account
came to agreement with the Calvinist heresy. Arnauld deferred judgement until having heard his
colleague Pierre Nicole’s thoughts; with the validation of “Nicole’s negative judgement” he
expressed his disapproval in a letter to Clerselier, which he specifically requested be shown to
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Desgabets, “no doubt in hopes that it would dissuade the Benedictine from developing his
eucharistic account further.”213
It is unclear how sophisticated Desgabets’ thought was or would have become if he had
been able to publish more often, but luckily Considérations sur l'état présent de la controverse
touchant le T. S. Sacrement de l'autel garnered enough buzz to last a lifetime. Insofar as it states
an intention to weigh in on the problem of the Eucharist, the title alone displays a markedly
different approach to controversy than that typified by Traité de physique, both of which were
published in 1671.214 And it was certainly not Rohault’s work which accounted for the
(previously mentioned) address later that same year by the Archbishop of Paris, to the faculty
deans and college principals of the University of Paris on behalf of the king, demanding firm
adherence to the terms against anti-Aristotelian teaching established in 1624, and declaring that
the “certain opinions” unacceptable within higher learning were also present “in the rest of the
city and in certain parts of the kingdom.”215 It was expressly worried that such opinions might
disrupt “the explanation of our mysteries.” This was true for any Cartesianism, but only
Desgabets had been foolish enough to spell this out in public.
Considérations had been published anonymously abroad but was quickly connected to its
author, no doubt due to the ample details it gives of a uniquely contentious relationship with the
Port-Royalists.216 In particular, it noted their disapproval of the contra Mesland account but then
proceeded to defend it on the basis of the claims made in the Port-Royalists’ latest work.217 To
reiterate, the heretical skeleton he had dragged out from the closet of the vulnerable Cartesians
was then shown to follow from the premises claimed by the ultra-vulnerable Cartesian213
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Jansenists who had explicitly denounced him. There is no way his philosophy as such could
possibly have been taken seriously under such circumstances. He had published the
Considérations to convince the Port-Royalists that they should take his radical view, but this
instead had the predictable consequence of publicly implicating them as heretics in a way they
had no doubt hoped to avoid. This led Arnauld and Nicole to an audience with the Archbishop of
Paris in 1672, at which they denounced Desgabets’ thought, again.218 They were in the middle of
trying to prove that Jansenism need not be considered anti-establishment or heretical, and
therefore were not inclined to public Cartesianism, association of heresy with Cartesianism, and
the association of heresy with Port-Royalist thought in its own right. That this happened in the
first years of the peace of Clement IX, the best opportunity the Port-Royalists ever had for
casting Jansenism as an acceptable alternative to the orthodox reading of Augustine, must have
been enormously frustrating. After asserting for the record that Desgabets was wrong, the
Archbishop also ordered that further normative pressure be brought to bear through the monastic
channels, resulting in his forbodence from further propagation of the contra Mesland account,
which he was also required renounce.219 That at the height of the scandal he would express regret
and a lack of forethought concerning possible audiences at the times of writing and publication
only validates the foregone conclusion regarding Desgabets’ awareness of the political
implications that necessarily came into play when one took the stand in his society, irrespective
of the truth of his claims.220 Thus if antimodern is to mean a mind better suited to a cloistered
intellectual sphere, one before the public scrutiny and politics of discursive vulnerability, then
Desgabets was that. His metaphysical thought may have been far more secular than any
occasionalism, but the directness with which he approached collaboration showed maladaptation
218
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to the social realities that accompanied the new rationalism to say the least. His Benedictine
vows provide a good angle on his marginalization: as the positive affirmation of the same
authority structure which would see him silenced, scrutiny of implications and discourses
labelling deviance were welcomed into his life prior to any space for advantageous selfpresentation. And indeed, there is no reason to assume that Desgabets sought the kind of tactical
advantage of the discursive high-ground that other Cartesians of a more judicious, even urbane
sense of what is appropriate, as well as the solitaires at Port-Royal, have been seen to pursue.
Perhaps cutting his losses had never crossed his mind, and he put such stock in the normative
account and felt such expressive intimacy among the brothers of his order (with whom he had a
following) that he simply began expressing the truth exactly as it appeared to him and never
stopped, propelled by the touching conviction that truth alone might carry the day.221 If this
likelihood is the case then he was far from modern in the sense that genuine Cartesians
embodied.
The wave of official action against Cartesianism that drove it further underground at the
beginning of the 1670s may have been sparked unilaterally by the actions of Robert Desgabets,
but the events which followed should also be understood as unfolding in line with the logic by
which a totalitarian regime of cultural descriptive power negotiates and updates norms within its
institutions. Desgabets remained active through the decade and continued to embarrass fellow
Cartesians, but would never scandalize on the grand scale again; that power had not been his in
the first place, as he was the occasion for a broader social production. The exposure Desgabets
brought to the most antisocial, counter-cultural and heretical aspects of Cartesianism allowed for
institutional discourses of explicit condemnation to finally take place, advancing a process of
delineation between on the one side the “politically destabilizing Jansenism” and associated anti221
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authoritarian aspects of Cartesianism, and on the other, that which constituted the first
functionally normative Cartesianism, which might also be called the first normative science in
the modern sense.222 This is to say that leaving Desgabets squarely in the past allowed
Cartesianism to begin an ascent towards legitimacy which had not yet begun during the 1660s
and the socially ambiguous period of the Wednesdays; and indeed, when further political
pressure was put on the Cartesian-Jansenist connection in 1691, (again in the form of demands
by the Archbishop on the University) it was as a far more delicate banning of particular theses,
and it again cleared the way for further legitimization.223 For as early as 1678, with Cartesianism
safely rejected from all official accounts, Louis XIV allowed it to be taught to his son,
responding that he was not worried so long as it was prevented from being established in any
position of institutional legitimacy.224 This establishment would ultimately occur by way of the
authority vested nominally in Nicolas Malebranche, and supported by his theory for an absolute
grounding for the occasionalist epistemological program.
Malebranche was first exposed to Cartesian thought by his reading of L’Homme the year
it was published, thereby an occasionalist from the start, and an “establishment” (used only in the
loose sense connected to the Wednesdays crowd and Clerselier’s executive authority) one at
that.225 However, his publication of Recherche de la verite in 1674 problematized that implicit
association by drawing to the fore epistemological ambiguities present in La Forge and Rohault.
Indeed, one must consider how much of the criticism levelled against it was a response to the
theoretical seriousness with which it took the established role of God, and the elimination of
much of the ambiguity which had been maintained from Descartes. Having been led by La Forge
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to reject the truly Cartesian (that of the latter-day Descartes) account of the relation between
concepts and the states of affairs which they reflect, under which the idea was equivocal to the
extent of possibly bridging the difference between brain-states and thoughts, occasional theory
stood with what will be called the innateness question very much unanswered. Then as now, talk
of mental phenomena which are in any capacity or aspect innate is taken by many as anti-modern
and anti-scientific idealism; those who would judge Descartes on such ideologically rigorous
terms were spoken for by John Locke in his 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding.226
But those who took Descartes as claiming the existence of innate truths or laws, or who
understood his rationalism as incompatible with (all but the most radical) empiricism,
misunderstood that the usage was ontological and causal, and not directly epistemological. The
usage of both innate and “inbred” as equivalent terms for the same quality in a contemporary
English-language translation of a minor 1672 work gives a better sense of the concern the
(occasionalist) Cartesians were trying to address: if mental phenomena are causally and
qualitatively unrelated to states in the world, how do they happen and where does their content
come from?227 Descartes was interpreted as thinking that res cogitans “has a disposition to
acquire certain ideas when appropriately stimulated,” which is entirely useless if his account of
stimulus has been made inaccessible and irrelevant.228 The probabilistic hypothesis further
indicates the nature of occasionalist truth-claims as being both methodologically and
epistemologically ungrounded.
Malebranche took the orthodox Cartesian claim that unrepresentative phenomena
correspond to res extensa by virtue of God, and applied this rationally to the innateness question.
If appearances arise by His will and correspond to a materiality which is also His doing, it is
226
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intuitive that they would also come from God, in a sense.229 Finally, the project to characterize
certain knowledge on an absolute basis which Descartes at least aspired to initiate had a
functional theory.230 This required the introduction of another, “corresponding dualism” which
allowed a necessary connection between experience and absolute truth to be drawn.231 This was
motivated by the concern that inherently finite consciousness of nevertheless infinite beings,
such as res extensa and God, poses a problem of scope unless those infinite ideas exist ideally as
the infinite consciousness of God.232 Malebranches’ comfort with ideas being of but not
resembling things, and his neo-Platonic drive more generally to configure res cogitans relative to
a transcendent reality (while not viewing this as jeopardizing dualism) stems from his
commitment to Augustinian thought, which emphasizes a dependence relationship with God.233
This equipped him to advance the occasionalist discourse which needed to ground certainty
somewhere other than materiality, as he already felt it improperly sought there. What’s more,
this distinction between ideas in the most proper sense and the derivative, “subjective
modifications of the individual mind” to which Cartesians have access was commonly accepted
among the (broadly Augustinian) Oratorians.234 That structure put him on the opposite end of the
spectrum of authority control within monastic institutions from Degabet’s Benedictines, earning
him none of the official censure the other faced.
Despite being a fairly modest step from La Forge and Rohault, it was nevertheless the
first of its kind for the historical Cartesian orthodoxy, and drew a great deal of technical criticism
on that basis, questioning the relationships between ontological and functional claims, and so
229
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forth.235 His most extensive opposition was from Arnauld, a fellow Cartesian and Augustinian,
but the latter of the Jansenist stripe. The opposition which Malebranche faced was different from
what Desgabets endured, insofar as it was discernibly in-group, in a way that resembles modern
institutional (academic) discourse in the narrower sense meaning a field of positions oriented
around an ongoing process of theory analysis, which is to say that his claims were treated as at
least potentially true.
The first major disputant against the Recherche was Simon Foucher, who had just written
a book in 1673 with a similar title, Dissertations sur la recherche de la verité.236 This work
expressed a position of academic (classical) skepticism and probabilism.237 The full title of
Malebranche’s work not only references Foucher, but also Descartes and La Forge in an
interesting representation of the tradition at hand. However, Foucher took it as a response to his
work, quickly publishing a Critique de la Recherche de la verité in 1675.238 In this work he
expressed doubt concerning the possibility of a theoretical account which is functionally
analogous to realist representations of things themselves in any way, without violating the
orthodox “non-resemblance” of mental states.239 This is a fair critique, and amounts to a
conservative rejection of Malebranche’s attempt to speak for all occasionalists in virtue of the
implications of any occasionalism, and is what marks the divergence of his theory of “ideas in
God” from the occasional mainstream established at Rohault’s Wednesdays.240
Of far more interest than this theoretical exchange is the social circumstances of the
exchange of texts, which continued on. Malebranche’s Recherche was a longstanding project of
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multiple volumes, of which many excluding Foucher had been aware.241 Even Richard Watson,
Foucher’s leading advocate, characterized the Critique de la Recherche as a “lack of intelligence
of one kind or another” which he attributes to his relative lack of “contact with the philosophic
world of Paris.”242 It appears, fittingly, that the likely reason Foucher lacked such crucial social
access was social skills, judging by a dinner with a potential patron at which he “fought with
everyone and tried continually to talk of things unsuitable to the place and the people present,”
leading the Duke in question to reject him completely.243 This tendency to fail to understand the
importance of social context and audience played out most notably in the aftermath of Foucher’s
response to Recherche, which put Malebranche in the position to respond immediately that same
year, in the form of an “offensive preface” to the second volume which said Foucher had
misunderstood the work, and which is known to have injured his pride.244 From the perspective
of the Cartesian readership, Foucher fought an uphill battle. He was not an occasionalist, and
thus was arguing against a far better established figure than he. This social context was expressed
effectively as Malebranche’s ability to respond without having to publish a piece with a title
beginning Critique, as Foucher had. He simply unveiled his positive doctrine, allowing it to
speak against Foucher. This sequence of naming confuses an otherwise straightforward dialogue
between skeptic and idealist, in which a far greater perception of burden of proof would have
fallen on Malebranche than indeed did. The mockery Foucher faced at Malebranche’s hands for
failing to notice that only three of the projected five sections could not constitute a completed
work moved him to go to print again in 1676.245 His Réponse pour la Critique à la Preface du
second volume de la Recherche de la verité defensively repeated much of what had been said in
241
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the Critique, while also backtracking and downplaying his criticisms as having been aimed at
Cartesians more generally, not necessarily Malebranche alone.246 Foucher clearly understood that
his potential to aquire an authoritative statute was ruined by this embarrassing exchange, as he
never again engaged so contentiously in current affairs.
At least that is nearly true, as he published one other hasty defense in 1676 which was
directed at Desgabets rather than Malebranche. It should at this point be unsurprising that the
occasion for Foucher’s Nouvelle dissertation was the inexplicably poor social skills of the
Desgabets.247 Just as he had argued on behalf on the Port-Royalists in defense of something they
did not believe, he responded to Foucher’s Critique with the Critique de la Critique de la
Recherche de la verité, in which he defended a metaphysical system entirely different from
Malebranche’s.248 Not only did this draw further Eucharistic concerns to the Cartesian project, it
was also unsurprisingly denounced by the author it seemed to purport to defend.249 While in
fairness, a critique of a critique of X need not affirm X by strict necessity, only Desgabets would
misunderstand or be comfortable with its clear implication of doing so. Malebranche was so
confident of this that he endorsed it on that basis, without having yet been able to read it; being
shortly after the Eucharist scandal but prior to any published metaphysical deviance, it appears
Desgabets’ reputation did not yet proceed him as it would soon after.250 Thus Foucher was not
the only Cartesian commenter reflected in the preface to Malebranche’s second volume. The
phrasing of the allusion to Desgabets warrants attention, as its tongue-in-cheek reference to selfcontrol illuminates the relevance of the analysis at hand: he guesses that his detractors, and
specifically those who defended “a work in which they had no part,” did so because they had
246
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been “ill-treated by some invisible hand.”251 By facetiously assuming (as is only proper) the most
honorable and well-considered of motivations to guide Desgabets, Malebranche is forced to
conclude that the Critique de la Critique was the product of possession. This is the closest he can
come to expressing the actual simplest explanation, that Desgabets lacks discretion, without
openly violating the principle of civility which governed polite discourse. However, his
“invisible hand” comment nevertheless strikes directly at the heart of the Cartesian and
masculine anxiety over strict control of one’s public image. This encounter is readily explicable
in terms of Lewis Seifert's thesis of the hegemonic masculinity of civility which governed
authorship at the time: Malebranche manages his discursively dominant and socially elevated
position as the honnête homme by pointing to the fact that Desgabets plays the part of the
fanfaron, the unrefined blowhard, in comparison to himself, without sinking to his level (wit
eases the sting of remarks, socially speaking.)252 Desgabets subsequently responded to the
response to the Critique de la Critique by claiming that it had been published without his
permission, just as he did when the Considérations garnered such controversy; in this regard he
exemplified the lack of such control.253 The cautious Malebranche, apparently feeling that no
amount of distance between his career and that of Desgabets could be enough, added a warning
label to later editions of the second volume expressing his regret that the Critique de la Critique
had happened. The title which Malebranche had originally expected to describe a work of
theoretical backup in the battle over the direction of Cartesianism, instead ended up being quite
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literal, as the text which it described primarily sought to characterize the author of the Critique as
“not being concerned with the search for truth.”254
Malebranche was probably thrilled that Foucher and Desgabets went after each other, and
maybe also that they continued to do so long after the initial hostilities had ended. An official
draw-down of insult occurred when the 1678 reprint of Recherche lacked the inflammatory
preface, and was met with the equivalent omission from Foucher’s Réponse the following
year.255 His dispute with Arnauld was far more substantive, and extended from 1683 until the end
of the century and the death of the Port-Royalist.256 Arnauld’s first critique of Malebranche’s
Recherche, titled Des vraies et des fausses idées, was met the following year with a Réponse de
l’auteur De la Recherche of Malebranche’s own, specifically naming Arnauld, against which
Défense de M. Arnauld contre la réponse appeared also in 1685. On the basis of the assembled
evidence it is clear that the period from Malebranche’s public debut to the end of the century was
one of unprecedented belligerence for the underground Cartesian discourse, and indeed, it is all
too likely that seventeenth century readers had just as hard a time keeping the various Réponses
and Critiques straight as does the historian today. After Arnauld and Malebranche had aired
multiple rounds of criticism, the two carried on exchanging ideas, but did so in the form of
letters, apparently thinking it best to forego further publicity. While the Cartesian Eucharist
scandal of the early 1670s a thing of the past by that time, the Jansenist controversy was heating
back up, and both men did well to avoid negative publicity.
Not only was Arnauld the longest term of Malebranche’s theoretical critics, he was also
the most similarly disposed philosophically and theologically. That is to say, both were made
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vulnerable by their allegiances to Cartesianism and Augustinian theology. 257 They were also
intellectual associates before becoming rivals. Malebranche even sought Arnauld’s approval
before publishing his 1680 Traité de la nature et de la grâce, having both explained its contents
to him “at the home of a mutual friend,” as well as sending him a draft when Arnauld fled the
country for political reasons.258 It is this text which resulted in most of Malebranche’s body of
work being placed on the Index of Prohibited Books, for his occasionalism made miracles,
dogmatically interpreted “as events that violate all order” impossible, instead casting all events
as a kind of sequence of orderly miracles.259 However, the initial, central issue Arnauld took with
Malebranche’s thought was not motivated by the heresy of his theological innovations, but the
redundancy inherent to the ontology presented in the Recherche.260 It appears that as fringe
Augustinians at a time when the Jansenist scandal was silenced but still present in society, both
thought it best to avoid theological dispute. Instead, Arnauld attacked the God’s-mind
occasionalism on strictly metaphysical terms, rather than questioning whether God is of such a
nature as claimed; Des vraies et des fausses idées addressed Malebranche’s
“representationalism” and associated problems.261 He characterized Malebranche as claiming the
existence of an objective being, or res extensa; a host of objective ideas about that objective
being, or what he characterized as “être représentatif”; and on top of that, the awareness of the
être représentatif of the object in question.262 Arguing from the fact that the mind which is aware
must either be actively entertaining or incorporating an être représentatif, Arnauld insisted that
this act of ideation alone is sufficient to account for phenomena without reference to any ideal
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être représentatif. This was the most coherent of the conservative metaphysical critiques of
Malebranche, and was endorsed by “many great minds of the period.”263 However, Arnauld’s
own direct realism was of little significance beyond its influence on Régis.264 As the most
outspoken Jansenist-Cartesian, it is little surprise that his thought would fail to make the grade in
terms of socio-political permissibility, despite at one point having voice speaking against a man
who seems to have had very few allies, at least in terms of theoretical disputes.
The last crucial voice to stand against Malebranche, and the only one to make it to the
philosophically arbitrary but politically decisive finish line of 1699 with him, was Pierre-Sylvain
Régis, the “most outstanding protégé” to both Jacque Rohault and Robert Desgabets.265 He is
best identified as the opposing pole in the struggle for de facto theoretical dominance at that
moment of de facto legitimacy, and certainly saw himself as positioned to claim the authority of
synthesizing his underground tradition as late as 1690, when he published the grandly titled
Système de philosophie, contenant la logique, la métaphysique, la physique et la morale, which
was influential abroad if less so in the metropolis of Cartesian discourse. Régis was not an
occasionalist, as his allegiance to the intentionality of Desgabets reveals; however, a great deal
had changed in the decade since his predecessor’s infamy, such that Régis was able to emphasize
his own Cartesian orthodoxy relative to Malebranche, in virtue of a resemblance to the
conflicted, late Descartes.266 Clearly, the accord forged at the Wednesdays had become a thing of
the past. It is no great leap to infer that the high regard in which Rohault held Régis was
primarily informed by personal factors such as their relationship having started all the way back
in 1655, well before things got interesting, rather than much in the way of doctrinal
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inheritance.267 One can only wonder what effects would have been felt if Régis had been at
political liberty to continue the Wednesday conferences through the 1680s.
Heir would be a more accurate description than protégé, for the two actually stood at
odds on many issues. Rohault was no great theorizer, but Régis certainly was, endorsing the
former’s physics but rejecting his compromising metaphysics in favor of those of Desgabets.268
He also seems to have favored Desgabets’ impudence, or more charitably, team spirit, taking it
upon himself to produce a Réponse to the 1689 anti-Cartesian text, Censura philosophiæ
cartesianæ (he was, to his considerable credit, wise enough to wait until 1691 so as not to
jeopardize the publication of his Système, which had taken a decade to secure.)269 As no good
Réponse is complete without a preface of cutting remarks, Régis directly challenged the claim to
authority implicit in the work’s title, questioning not only his capacity to reject Descartes, but
even to comprehend “the works of this great philosopher”; this sort of polemic is a
complementary analog to the Cartesian practice of lamenting the burden they bear so as to make
traditionalists look slavish by comparison, for it is a sort of border-policing against traditionalist
attempts to assume the aesthetic of authority for which Cartesians sacrifice so much.270 The
Censura’s conservative author Pierre-Daniel Huet was so taken by Régis’ counter and the
publicity which it generated that he dedicated his 1692 Nouveaux Mémoires, a satirical
biography of Descartes to the “prince of the Cartesian philosophers,” said to be more Cartesian
than even their namesake himself, and who was revealed to be Régis only after his 1707
demise.271 These ways in which Régis and his predecessor exposed themselves publicly did not
draw the critique of their peers, as Malebranche's actions had, but rather attention to the socio267
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politically untenable components of their thought, by those reactionaries who would expose it
further. Régis' longstanding frankness about the “quasi-Spinozistic” features of his metaphysics
can be compared to Malebranche's unbroken silence on the ways in which his reading of
Augustine might or might not have drawn on current Jansenist trends.272
Insofar as Régis “proposed a reconciliation of Descartes’s dualism,” Huet’s judgement as
more rather than less Cartesian would not be endorsed by many occasionalists. However, there is
one bizarre distinction which Régis made which was not only embraced by occasionalists, but
that actually allowed for an important reconciliation between those who took after Rohault and
those who took after Malebranche. By 1690 the historical field of French Cartesian theories of
the natural world was populated, and so it would be true by conceit to say that the interesting
developments were no longer among those devising the systems, but rather using them; however,
it should also be emphasized that the users entered a positive breakthrough in the years 169093.273 The purely disciplinary distinction which Régis made in the Système is what allowed this,
making it now unavoidable to express that at some point, this Cartesian conversation which only
a generation earlier had been consigned to clandestine conversations in a Paris apartment,
denounced by all authorities, had crept silently into the institutional, sociable and visible space of
the French Royal Academy of Sciences. The Academy had been created for filling with the sort
of dualist rationalists who shall go unnamed in 1666, and by 1699 they had forgotten to exclude
the kind that had been named. When Régis made the distinction between the mechanical and the
physical, his motivation was already political reconciliation, but on a personal scale: he admired
and embraced the tradition in physics begun by his dead friend, Jacque Rohault, but this system
was a hypothetical corpuscularianism which postulated insensibly and indeed infinitely small
272
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particles, and which contradicted the approach of Régis’ own philosophy as well as the spirit of
occasionalism.274 However, it contradicted his (empiricism de-emphasizing) direct realism far
less than other more scientifically acceptable systems, such as that of Malebranche's followers in
particular, whose interest in describing the mechanical functioning evident in the world was only
truly validated when they began adapting calculus to the task, thereby producing “analytical
mechanics.”275 While truly an abominable dissection of the world, the physical-mechanical
distinction was no more so than the Cartesian dualism which motivated and grounded it (the
second instance of this theoretical reduplication of the discrete binary to be seen); physics was
speculation regarding the private nature of res extensa, or mind-independent matter, whereas
mechanics sought to infer the absolute relationship evident in a sequence of appearances. In a
socially real sense, Régis gave the so-called “Malebranche circle” technical permission to
develop an alternative explanatory project, and they began at once. As early as 1693 those
mechanists had made an ally of Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle; when he was made “perpetual
secretary” of the Royal Academy in 1697, Cartesianism had made it to the top.276
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Chapter Three
Institutional Maturity of the New Philosophy
It is the transitional period of technical discourses quickening pace but efforts to
maintain nominal investment in the power of the traditional cultural hegemony that is typically
meant by “early modern.” Urban life and the self-conscious bearing of civility which blended out
from the courts there remains of the concern, as does that increasingly ubiquitous project of
socio-discursive meaning called honor. As a quality, honor underpinned and measured not only
the virtues of an individual, but the also the “worldly goods” and legal privileges which they
inherited.277 As a discourse, honor negotiated the relative value of the members of an elite class,
the existence of which was wholly dependent on the iniquity of a hierarchical arrangement which
could nevertheless be influenced by a select few. This discourse of interpersonal judgment is
intimately bound to the history of the Academy as the site where a familiar masculinized
metaphysics of descriptive supremacy took its first steps towards interpolation in a broader
system of power. This culture of reaffirmed honor, which burdened the gentleman of any
standing with the “obligation to present himself in public,” would find its ideal theater in
academic life.278 In time participation in cutting-edge scientific discourses came to reflect the
character of the participant. Consequently, its institution was hallowed in a manner reserved for
longstanding organs of the Ancien Regime.
privileges of the Academy
In his work The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution, Roger Hahn notes that the prestige of
the Royal Academy grew not merely on the basis of the advancement of its works but as a sphere
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of high culture more generally. 279 And while it is difficult to argue this from necessity, there are
numerous reasons why the Academy was perfectly positioned for incorporation into the
traditional cultural regime. In a unilateral, monarchical culture such as that of early modern
France, an honorable association with the state was an indication of the highest virtue. The king,
as representative of God, ordered his realm on the basis of a sacred design. No institutional
foundation, then, could surpass the honor of a mandate from Louis XIV himself. The nature of
the Academy’s close relationship to the crown changed over time, but always included a unique
intellectual freedom.280 The privilege of the king, codified by the 1699 reforms, to withhold his
recognition of not only the appointment of officers but indeed the admission of any given
individual to the entry-level ranks of académicien no doubt lent incomparable legitimacy to
those who did hold such positions.281 This structure of delegated management and centralized
authority was a thematic constant in early modern France, in this case deployed with the
intention of ensuring that the Academy kept tightly oriented toward its twofold purpose of
accruing glory to the king and serving “the practical interests of the state.”282 The latter, it is
worth noting, was understood to be a long-term route to the former, but can today be understood
as securing the utility of rationalists. So while the Academy was largely structured as a typical
bureaucratic body (after 1699), its object was the production of the prestige which stemmed from
both actionable truths and successes on that basis, as opposed to petty administration. Another
key feature of the original Academy intended to facilitate its assimilation to the social elite and
cultural mainstream was the decision to restrict its purview strictly to descriptive science. 283 This
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was done to avoid conflict with the authoritative function of the universities, which maintained
their public monopoly on metaphysical discourses.
The great mark of the Academy’s prestige was its right to bypass the censors’ review, an
exception unique in this period when a modern system of state licensed publication was taking
shape.284 Texts that failed to find approval were, at best, printed in the Low Countries and
smuggled into Paris, although such activities were actively prosecuted, and even with access to
forbidden work, selectively designated legitimacy kept the printed word “remarkably well
controlled” as sphere of official thought.285 Above all else, this indicated the crown’s trust in the
Academy’s capacity to meet the cultural standards set for it. In regards to this dignity, class
privilege and expertise are relevant explanatory factors. But particular weight should be given to
the good discursive breeding savants actively demonstrated by refraining from aesthetically
troubling metaphysical dispute, as was their charge. With the same tactical duplicity that
Cartesians maintained nominal subordination yet pursued empowerment in their private lives, the
Academy began (almost immediately) approving scientific work produced by non-members as
fit for publication.286 By 1702, its leadership had gained official and “quasi-official” editorial
control of two independent publications, Connaissance des Temps and Journal des Sçavans,
respectively. 287 Beyond this, “strong-arm techniques” effectively controlled the voices of the
numerous publications which the Academy designated as fit for print, while the reach of clout
went farther still.288 Even for those to whom other options were available, Academic approval
lent unique credence to a product.289 In less than fifty years, an exemption from censorship
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developed into the de facto censor for all things scientific. That this was permitted to happen is
good support for the notion that the Academy was held in high esteem by elite culture, but so too
was the jealousy with which it protected the basis of its privilege, for there is a demonstrated
awareness of the precariousness inherent to the position of institutional de facto Cartesians.290
The vetting processes for the Academy’s publications were so thorough as to raise [the author’s]
suspicions as to where scrutiny ended and a spectacle of diligence, for to reassure the dubious,
began. To wit, anything published under the auspices of the Academy was first presented to the
congregation of its membership, (auxiliary publications were instead reviewed by a team of
commissaires for this stage) before then being considered by the powerful Comité de Librairie,
the pinnacle of this symbolic hierarchy of discernment.291 Works were rejected at this stage for
inaccuracy, vagueness, unoriginality, and unacknowledged intellectual debts. Even then, it had
still to pass through the peer-review system and perhaps multiple rounds of revision.292 In
contrast, the state considered the assent of an individual académicien, employed privately, to be
sufficient rigor to pass a work through the standard channel of censorship.293 In these ways, the
Academy successfully enacted political hegemony over the burgeoning scientific consciousness
in France, thereby elevating itself as the most visible and prestigious venue for exchanging ideas
and accruing notoriety.294
The ritual meaning of this elaborate process was submission. He who submitted his work
did the same with his pride, as both were callously cast off if no merit were found.295 This could
be called the proceduralization of Desgabets’ fate, except the committee also held the right to
require any editing or changes prior to printing. The author entered the process yielding all rights
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but that of basic intellectual property, but if the paper is rejected outright it means the Academy
determined him to have made no such discovery. Thus, even beyond the legal and cultural
control it achieved, the Academy demonstrated a penchant for empowerment with a distinctly
literary, or perhaps masculine, sensibility. Scientific projects were uncased as coldly as though
doing so were itself a scientific procedure, rather than a life’s work. This often humiliating
process was to emphasize the permissibility of that which was accepted, functioning as a socially
significant passing. This act of submission by the component savant to the corporate whole was
the central power-relation active in structuring the character of this sociability of “academic
politeness” as subordinate to the French state.296 Not only were none of those present at liberty
to speak freely the truth as they saw it, but even among themselves they largely disavowed the
meaning of their claims beyond the will the Lord. These factors prevented everything that can be
called scientific valid in modern terms, yet the centrality of the textual normative threshold was
established.
Academy of the privileged
As much care was given to grooming the Academy’s input as its output. Men spent entire
careers working to find their way in.297 One can imagine how frustrated such anonymous
contributors, perhaps lifelong Parisians and loyal subjects, would have felt to struggle in this
way, while esteemed thinkers from across Europe were invited by the Academy’s leadership to
emigrate and become members, with funding by the French state.298 But this emphasis was the
norm, when a reputation was the only effective route to further repute. Rather than being
assembled as a team to reach some particular discovery first, membership of the Academy was
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curated, like a museum. With the requisition of honor always in mind, the Academy was the
purpose-built nexus of a process of ideological incorporation which drew in both men and works
of distinction.
While the Academy would more formally become the clearing house of what might be
termed French scientific mercantilism after 1699, looking to its early history reveals emphases
which were later obscured.299 The choice of founding members was of greater significance than
the theoretical principles validated by that choice; indeed, theoretical convictions were
themselves unattractive.300 It was motivated instead by the rationalist mentality of the day, which
is to say that novel, private experiences of truth which were class-coded, masculinized,
mechanized and theologically subordinate were at least as tolerable as they were technologically
instructive. Once chosen, a “communal instinct” developed which disposed them to record
everything they did.301 During this period, the activities of the Academy were relatively
unstructured, with biweekly meetings at the center of its affairs.
By the decade preceding the reform, a situation of rampant absenteeism, incomplete
minutes, and general disengagement had taken hold.302 Eroded to the point of being treated as
“merely a prestigious affiliation,” the Academy was in need of change.303 This occurred for two
primary reasons, both of which are proxies for social access. On the one hand was the disruption
of the traditions of the original, close-knit community whose members were patronized by the
minister of culture and other magistrates and aristocrats.304 On the other, paid pensions were
increasingly scarce.305 “Pensions,” writes Alice Stroup, “implied a hierarchy within the
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Academy.” They were based on the pensioner’s “international renown, their access to ministers
and the king, and their social origins,” well beyond his productive work.306 In the absence of a
“personal fortune,” royal pensions or other kinds of patronage were a necessity. 307 Those in need
took teaching positions and other work outside the Academy, certainly accounting for
absences.308 And, through the decade, pensions were defaulted upon, or distributed
inconsistently. 309 To borrow Descartes’ phrase, called neither by birth nor fortune to take part,
many found themselves unable to do so. The reforms for which Fontenelle was the public face
not only emphasized the “homologies between academic and courtly civility” in discourse but
also means, coming together as a newfound emphasis on manners as a route to patronage (as a
route to legitimacy.)310 That this scrutiny and reorientation for the Cartesianized subject would
come in living memory after a similar experience of discursive policing, namely the Eucharist
scandal of the early 1670s, must have been a difficult adjustment. In less than a decade “sociable
virtues” had not only become “more than mere advantages,” but “potent requirements for
asserting and establishing intellectual authority.” 311
The most important change on the normative-descriptive level of managing the social
interface between said and unsaid, in the balance of which the fate of Cartesians has been seen to
have hung through the entirety of the seventeenth century, was the Academy’s formalization.
Indeed the intervention of 1699 was not a true reform, due to the prior “absence of formal
statutes,” a decision that has been interpreted as “a deliberate means of denying the
Academicians the comfort of a guaranteed annuity.”312 The ambitions of Colbert are certainly
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visible in this, as are general patterns toward increased administrative control, but what else? The
reforms are appropriately characterized as bringing the Academicians in from the shadows of
“secrecy” and onto a path towards complicity and integration into hegemonic power structures,
but one must wonder what they were doing out there in the first place; that they were being
intentionally denied the option of “recourse to any legally binding document” only points to this
question more emphatically.313 The half-century of marginalization and mistrust of Cartesianism
that was just beginning to give way by the 1690s points to at least a congruity of motivations.
Conservatively, the threat of a dangerous element which Jansenism presented for Cartesianism,
the rejection of substance and the animation of living beings, and the numerous other antiAristotelian worries presented by the Jesuits help to explain a reluctance to articulate a place in
society which was purpose-built for exactly the sort of people who might be caught up with such
subversive thinking. Particularly considering the rhetorical sensibility of the seventeenth century
Cartesian dualist and how it might be approached by those who would come to terms with it, it
should be asked how the claim of epistemological autonomy as a necessary structural feature of
being and thus prior to discourse would be addressed by an absolute regime of descriptive power
which valued both its aesthetic of domination, and practical truths. In short it makes sense that
when his would-be technicians refuse to name the political dimension of privileges which they
privately take as theoretically given, Louis XIV would respond in kind by refusing to name the
social actuality of their position, what authority grounds it and what it says about them. In this
light, the original meeting place of the Academy in the royal library appears as supervision.314
The legitimating force of the royal statutes opened the way for publicity to be pursued as
a route to credibility. 315 This allowed for the relatively uncomplicated, elite in-group socialization
313
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among Academicians and the nobility, which did wonders for the reputation of the institution as
a whole.316 Following in this period, the conscientiously expanded institutional prestige could be
deployed gainfully, alleviating financial issues for some.317 And whether it should be considered
an unspoken secondary goal of these reforms, or merely a manifest consequence of putting a
Malebranchean at the discursive helm, the de facto integration of underground Cartesianism in
the course of the 1699 reforms is crucial to understanding how the Academy could become more
esteemed than it had been before. While the threat of scandal was by no means completely
eliminated, the admission of Régis and Malebranche seems to have signalled the relative
permissibility of having a personal history of intra-Cartesian theoretical disputation. This was no
doubt instrumental in the many decades long process of lowering barriers of taboo surrounding
Cartesian endeavors and honorable association with those who undertook them.
Creating a situation in which membership was valued as though “it were a title of
nobility” was a crucial advancement of the Academy’s agenda, but it does not yet answer the
question in regards to selection criteria.318 In short, merit was only a relevant factor for men of
bourgeois and noble status. Members did not emerge from the overwhelmingly large lower
echelons of society.319 University degrees were increasingly prominent, and family dynasties
were not uncommon.320 Of course, the central indication that prestige was functionally and
symbolically equivalent to hierarchy in this context is the absence of women. A century before
the founding of the Royal Academy of Science, the status of the académicienne was an open
question, when elite women had participated in the less formal predecessor academies earlier in
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the century.321 Women could be found as participants or spectators at any discussion or spectacle
of science from which they were not barred. Unable to determine a single conclusive factor,
Londa Schiebinger cites the Academy’s “monarchical and hierarchical” nature, the formality
conveyed by its election and salary practices, and its exclusiveness.322 Indeed the confluence of
these factors, as the measure of social access, is a convincing explanation. But this is to say that
the explanation is not in the reasons why women were functionally barred, but those determining
why those chosen were. It was crucial that many be excluded to indicate the special tendency
toward prestigious work of the membership.323 It selected for individuals who were ambitious in
making themselves heard, but who nevertheless accepted personal and discursive subordination
whenever appropriate.
the meaning of publication
Having furnished this social space and filled it with reputable men, how was the work to
proceed? It was evident that learning should be recorded, but the next step was initially not as
obvious as it would become, and printings were made for royal records, rather than
publication.324 At this stage, texts were functionally indistinguishable from the mapping and
engineering projects in which the Academy was also engaged, and were produced as tools of
state, rather than the benchmark of professionalism they would become.325 In the earlier days of
the Academy they had observed an “old, Baconian ideal” by publicizing findings anonymously,
but came to reverse that policy completely (and abandon those values.)326 The change of most
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enduring significance of the 1699 reforms was the formalized pivot toward publicity, and the
recognition that greater honor resulted from the wider distribution of works.
The Academy from its inception was a place for sharing appropriate ideas with the
appropriate audience.327 It is worth noting here that, being assembled as such, and free to discuss
their work with one another, there is no reason to think that the Academic community would
have intuitively felt the absence of a printed compilation of the discoveries of everyone in the
room, especially considering the normative leeway speech offers. They were, on the other hand,
keenly aware of how easily discoveries, formulae, and inventions could be stolen. One of the
Academy’s oldest functions was as a measure against this: the formal procedure upon arriving at
such a novelty was to deliver a sealed envelope attesting to one’s discovery, to be dated for
future comparison in the event of another claimant.328 This allowed ideas to be shared without
concern. It also reveals the significant fact that the timestamping and authoritative functions of
the modern journal predated that of the circulation of articles.
Not merely the will to know, but the will to know first, drove the ambitions of the French
state and the members of its Academy. It is difficult to conceive of a single rationale for this
preoccupation other than the “showing forth of traits” which drives cultures of honor-bound
masculinity.329 In the research and development of a work of say, history, one could argue that
the inherently laborious process which is necessarily concretized in a text will tend to lead its
creator to feel a bit possessive of it. But it is not the right of authorship that is of concern here,
for the kind of right asserted has been revealed to predate any meaningful association with a text.
It is true that by the point in question at the turn of the eighteenth century, scientific
experimentation often required expensive or complicated instruments, but this was far from the
327
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norm.330 While egoism and financial investment might explain a desire on the part of the
individual, this desire does not itself justify a right. Is the relevance of identifying the discursive
subject not best explained by the fact that even casual Cartesians took seriously the view that any
validly-formed truth-claim is a rational interpretation by some res cogitans concerning only
appearances identical to itself, and is as such emergent from it in an ontologically irreducible
manner? La Forge may have explained how claims based on intuitive judgements are not in the
business of carrying existential (or in the fullness of time, causal) weight, and Malebranche
offered reassurance that claimants were necessarily and apologetically mistaken if (sociopolitically normative) God was slighted by their claim, but the functional epistemological role of
the individual mind was nevertheless maintained in full fashion. And if the importance of a claim
is to be wrapped up in the reputation of the claimant, as Descartes advocated be done and as elite
European men of the period took increased care to do, then it must be attributed to an individual.
The logic which drove the imperative within the Academy toward an individuated, textual
procedure for adjudicating that which was official, true and circulated from that which was not,
was served by functions of both praise and blame. The same record of authorship which proved
rights of discovery also bound one to it, as official testimony complete. This can be seen as
discursive insurance against another instance of the explanatorily muddled situation that called
for the ontological cataclysm of Cartesian doubt in the first place, as a paper trail now existed
which scrutinized and controlled individuals, if not as profoundly the epistemological basis for
discernment.
The institutionalized journal was born from a new relationship between discovery and
discoverer. The standardiztion of scientific literature was formally realized as one of the reforms,
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which established Histoire et Mémoires, “the foremost scientific series of the century.”331 It was
the flagship publication of the Academy, presented as the year-in-review synopsis of scientific
progress, “communicated to the Academy from all parts of the world,”332 with an emphasis on
sufficiently casual language for the non-professional public.333 The discourses which had been
seen as directly threatening the cultural function of the university system half a century earlier
were given an organ of canonical expression. This same phenomenon can be seen as Histoire et
Mémoires facilitating Academic professionalism to the extent that scientific goals and
motivations were able to vary by individual, while compatibility was maintained by default.
For the average member, let alone the scientist submitting his observations from outside
the Academy, the fight for the competitive pagespace was an uphill battle. In response to the
widely promised and generally insufficient pensions of the pre-1699 era, the rank of
pensionnaire was made to actually deliver on a comfortable stipend.334 From this position of
means above many of their associates, this rank succeeded in maintaining a dominance over the
public discourse.
The Comité de Librairie existed to enforce the standards of scholarship befitting
association with the Academy. Given that the perpetual aim was the maintenance and expansion
of institutional honor, the judgements rendered are revealing. Papers were not only rejected for
attesting to someone as the author who did not in fact write it, but also for being submitted
anonymously after 1699.335 Enormous care was taken to assure that information claimed as new
was so in fact, a distinction which took into consideration the likelihood of duplicate prior
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publications by the same author.336 In the case of perfunctory approval by the Comité a paper
would be examined in what is possibly the world’s first peer review system. 337 This entailed
research into claims and the repetition of experimental evidence. And to add further to the list of
scientific cultural trends set by the Academy, citations recognizing debt to past works were a
necessary component of approval, in anticipation of modern footnote practice.338
The Academy and its Comité gave and withheld recognition in a manner consistent with a
self-conception as the arbiter of scientific truth. As has been seen, a capacity to bring to bear the
implication of inauthenticity for any science it had not expressly approved came with the
hegemonic stature.339 But of far greater interest is the appearance of an anxious reservation in
response to situations of ambiguity sufficient to render arbitration risky. 340 It is that same
reservation characteristic of the interpersonal paradigm of civility and the royal mandate to the
Academy, both manifestations of the concerns of political absolutism, as well as the
epistemological sensibilities of Cartesian scientists.341 Such evidence that the most powerful
scientific institution at the beginning of the eighteenth century was concerned that it might
tarnish its reputation, whether or not it was reasonable to do so, by publishing a single inaccuracy
in place of a truth is yet another indication of the high-stakes, high-society discourses upon
which its reputation hinged.
the publication of meanings
“By submitting his creation to the collective judgement of his colleagues,” writes Roger
Hahn, dreamily, of the scientist, “he protected everyone—including himself—from the vagaries
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of his imagination and the subjectivities of individual creation.”342 It remains to be seen what
protection there is against the specificities of his appropriation, or the objectivities created by his
collective. What remains is to examine how the rules, practices, and obligations of the Academy
made the promotion of an attitude of pragmatic, metaphysical quasi-realism the best means by
which to serve the interests of the various parties, and how Malebranchean thought and the
capacity it gave “natural philosophy...to approximate the certainty which is available in
mathematics” was central to this development.343
Contention within the institution was to be avoided at all costs, and was met with
reprimand.344 Likewise, members were forbidden to criticize the Academy, and were held
responsible for any disrespectful activities discovered to be undertaken elsewhere.345 In general,
though, members were happy to maintain their reputation of being motivated by “professional
honor, and devotion toward the public good.”346 In the same vein, disputed topics were unlikely
to be published. Instead, the subjects which were most likely to find their way into Histoire et
Mémoires were those that were uncontroversial given the political and cultural context of the
Academy, and novel to its discourse without drawing upon metaphysical innovation.
These two requirements could, judging by what was in fact published, be satisfied by
anything from a description of the effect of approaching rain on a barometer,347 to that of a
brazen description of torture of a madwoman (many more stories of abuse grace these hallowed
pages.)348 This appears to be an especially strange reality in view of the often purported virtue of
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experimentation; that is, until it is recognized that experimentation was understood particularly
as, and valued for its capacity to allow, “the deliberate abandonment of verbal dispute” (or more
accurately it was a substitute for the disputation which had been denied a legitimate place.)349
Prior historically to the development of a metaphysically satisfying yet actionable scientific
method and extolled in generality beyond any basis in quantified data, what is this experimental
ideal but, to adapt a phrase, “a poetry of soldierly decorum,” enjoining a company of equals by
their shared experience of entitlement, in the name of science?350 Truly, experimentation in the
typical sense of the word is simply the testing of limits, something which, for a member of the
elite in early modern France, referred only towards those who were even more socially elevated,
and not to those below. Any system which could further naturalize this arrangement, such as
traditions of professional courtesy in addition to experimentation, served an important
ideological purpose. In the Cartesian context experimentation has been shown to be no different
from experience, at least in terms of the phenomenal data procured. Any similarity to modern
scientific experiment must be a function of the role played by the rational subject, which, in the
absence of any empiricism, was primarily a socio-political one.
locating the new science of motion
At this point it is clear that whatever served to fill the pages of the official publication
exemplifying the work of an institution which forbade discussion of religion and politics
outright, and which limited even conversations about “morality, history, or grammar” to be
“only in passing and in relation to physics or to exchanges among men,” must have been to some
extent arbitrary.351 A range of related ways in which this necessity might be understood have
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been considered, including the aesthetic priorities of absolutist monarchy, the normative political
function of mysteries of theology, the social impossibility of organic and continuous
metaphysical debate and subsequent discursive coherence of philosophical principles due in
large part to the silence coerced by these first two factors, and the still open question of how any
epistemology, sufficiently proceduralized as to be called scientific, might function within
Cartesian dualism (at last count, mainline occasionalism was avowedly speculative and
Malebranchean “ideas in God” had been widely critiqued as unrealistic and ontologically
baroque.) The Comité de Librairie was only as authoritative as the standards by which it judged,
and the cultural logic of the day saw propriety as best served by the empowerment of an
individual to narrativize these standards. This was the agenda which guided Fontenelle’s career.
Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle was to the rationalist cultural situation of Cartesian
thought as Voltaire would be to the ésprit of experimentalism a generation later. He was not
scientifically productive, but understood and embraced the implications of the new sciences and
New Philosophy in a distinctly evangelical manner. Prior to his reformative role in the Academy,
Fontenelle had already established himself as a uniquely entertaining proponent of intellectual
modernism, by means of his 1686 Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes habités. As the title
suggests, this literary work explores the most titillating possibilities presented by the antiAristotelian lineage in cosmology which connected Copernican heliocentricity to the Cartesian
vortical physics which it informed, speculating on no less than the possibility of astronautics, the
likelihood of extraterrestrial life, and the implications of the recent discovery of the “compelling
ubiquity of [microscopic] life”; that pluralité des mondes presented a vision of a radical cultural
modernism in which “anthropocentrism is obsolete,” but was nevertheless published legally in
France, says a great deal about the author’s elevated place within a socio-discursive regime of
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class and sex status (likewise does the innovatively condescending gallantry with which the
masculine narrator instructs his noblewoman interlocutor, but as a model for gendered yet civil
(which is to say, passing) discourses of intellectual franchise, rather than as a mere benefit from
power relations.)352
By all accounts, Fontenelle was welcome and indeed belonged “at the center of French
intellectual life.”353 His career in letters was funded by his uncles Pierre and Thomas Corneille,
both of whom were famous authors; this class background and industry connection was a perfect
route of “access to the intellectual and social circles of Paris.”354 In 1691 he became a member of
both the Académie des sciences and Académie française, the latter being the institution tasked
with rendering the one true French language and which spent the decade finishing the first
edition of its Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie française dedié au Roy; then, in 1701, just two years
after his extensive role publicizing the changes to the Académie des sciences, he was inducted
into the freshly expanded ranks of the antiquarian Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres,
the institution concerned with the majesty of history and prose.355 As a member of a majority of
the five bodies which would later be incorporated as the Institut de France, he enjoyed social
access and discursive purchase at the heart of the statist project of intellectual modernism. As his
two other Academic positions show, Fontenelle was recognized as demonstrating technical
precision as well as exquisite style in his writing, both of which were crucial to the descriptive
responsibilities of perpetual secretary. Apparently taking the perpetuity seriously, Fontenelle's
appointment to the position in 1697 and assumption of responsibilities in 1699 overlapped with
the ambiguous persistence of the old secretary, Jean-Baptiste du Hamel, until his death in 1706;
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his “awkward relations” and advocacy for Latinate scientific discourse reveal his maladaptation
to the changes afoot by that time.356 His incapacity to travel led to the Sçavans editor Gallois
being brought into the Academy from 1668 as assistant secretary. 357
While mere consent had already been bred as a narrow range of metaphysical
dispositions and groomed as the convergence of both active and passive manifestations of
privilege, the appearance of a more thoroughgoing unanimity did indeed require manufacture.
Securing an aesthetic of coherence within the Academy can fairly be understood as a two-man
job, with Fontenelle being the “man on the inside,” if inside is to indicate the normative
discourse of scientific description. Fontenelle was its “intelligencer,” and Jean-Paul Bignon was
its power broker.358
The development which occasioned the possibility of a thaw in relations and an
institutional initiative towards a reduction of official anti-Cartesian rhetoric and policy was,
fittingly, the redistribution of ministerial powers at the highest levels of government. With the
sudden death in 1691 of Secrétaire d'État de la Guerre François Michel le Tellier, marquis de
Louvois, who had held executive control over all the academies, the king granted those same
powers to his Secrétaire d'État à la Maison du Roi Louis Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain.359
A transfer of jurisdiction between these two Great Offices in particular suggests a great deal
about how drastically the social image of the new sciences might havo changed in the course of
just thirty-three years; whereas the original rationale for the Academy had been presented rather
seriously as its being a source of innovations in weapons technology, (something as ugly as antiaristotelianism could only be put toward an ugly end) by the end of the century it was
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appropriate to the king's chief of staff, minster of Catholic and Protestant affairs as well as for
the city of Paris.360 In 1699 he also became the first modern Chancellor of France, the position
responsible for ensuring the subsequent political efficacy of the declarative speech of the king.
The enormously powerful Pontchartrain's sister was married to Jérôme Bignon II, father to JeanPaul and middle of three successive avocats général to the parlement of Paris, sending the whole
“family spiralling up the social scale [sic]”; the Bignon in question had all the advantages which
might have “predestined him to a career of distinction,” even abandoning the Port-Royalism of
his grandfather, which would have been wholly untenable after the Edict of Nantes was revoked
in 1685.361 However, one tradition he did share with Jérôme I was to be made grand maître of the
king's library.362
Pontchartrain appointed his nephew as his representative in the Academy (entailing full
membership) the year he was given that power, which was also that in which Bignon was
ordained. Indeed much of Pontchartrain's power was delegated to Bignon, rendering him the “de
facto culture minister” with nebulous authority over all the academies.363 At some point during
that decade he got himself elected president over the Academy of sciences, and in 1697 gave
Fontenelle his distinguished position.364 The chairmanship functioned as both a debate moderator
and representative for the crown and was reappointed annually by the king; Bignon also
dominated this, serving thirty-two times in thirty-five years. 365 Is it any surprise that someone so
well connected to positions of power would, when reforming the Academy, structure it “as a
strict hierarchy?”366
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Fontenelle would later present a legacy stretching back to the turn of the century, of
staunchly defended Cartesianism within the Academy. 367 Hopefully it is apparent at this point
how strange this would have been if it were true. What did exist from that time was the
establishment of an approach to interpreting the nature of motion as the norm, which was itself
informed by Malebranche's take on Cartesian metaphysics, and that had been in the works since
before Fontenelle was involved. The eventual name of this method, “analytic mechanics,”
betrays its emergence from the synthesis of the new Liebnizian calculus and the Augustinian's
occasionalism in metaphysics.368 That synthesis itself had been the work of the group of
academicians called (in natural philosophical contexts) the Malebranche circle, most prominent
among whom was Guillaume François Antoine, Marquis de l'Hospital.369 Malebranche and
l'Hospital had been instructed in the new infinitesimal calculus by Johann Bernoulli during his
trip to Paris in 1691.370 Malebranche's metaphysics and calculus was a match made in heaven for
a number of reasons: Malebranche was by far the Cartesian most interested in reconciling the
infinite, and calculus served this approach well; his occasionalism carved out a space for
mathematics to describe only a sequence of phenomena while nevertheless communicating the
absolute location of a material body as grounded in God (and thus circumventing the ontological
problems of mathematical representation); and infinitesimal calculus allowed the theoretical
characterization of natural infinitesimals, or the actual, infinitely small substances which were
central to Descartes' corpuscularianism in physics.
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Pierre Varignon, the member of Malebranche's circle who pioneered analytic mechanics
in 1692 and simply called it “the new science of motion,” had been inspired to do so by his
reading of Isaac Newton's 1687 Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica.371 Newton's work
was also a science of motion, but one which appeared incomplete to French eyes for two reasons,
the first being its intentional lack of epistemological claims, and the other was that he hid the
centrality of his own infinitesimal calculus to the discoveries he presented.372 But those were
things a Cartesian metaphysics circa 1690 could provide. Fontenelle played his part by insisting
that analytical mechanics was consistent with the spirit of both its Cartesian and Newtonian
influences.373
For as long as Bignon and Fontenelle had been plotting their institutional hegemony, they
were already banking on the new analytical mechanics with the intention to silence its detractors
and promote its advocates, respectively. The aim was to begin the new era of Academic life
under public scrutiny, already giving the impression that Varignon's analytics were well
established, to which end he was invited to present his work at two of the first four public
demonstrations; Fontenelle had these published in the popular literary magazine Mercure
gallant, which had already been preparing the reading public for years before the 1699 debut by
running articles on math to create a “vogue for Malebranchean mathematical philosophy.” 374
Further, Fontenelle made great use of his privilege of writing the summaries of and introductions
to diverse works, consistently presenting them as validating Descartes' own cosmology. His view
that heavenly motion was planets being swirled around in numerous celestial vortices satisfied
the requirement of his corpuscularian that there be no void. While key Cartesians such as
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Malebranche, Fontenelle, and Rohault were avowed vorticists, many more remained
uncommitted on the issue, as they had been trained to do.375 At the turn of the century Fontenelle
began to take the liberty of committing them himself, systematically giving “the impression that
vortical mechanics was more central to French academic science than in fact it was”; this was the
expressive component of what J.B. Shank calls the “pax analytica,” the normative “consensual
harmony” which was brought to bear upon academic discourse from the moment the
Pontchartrain regime had infiltrated the institution through the end date of this study in 1709, by
which time the desired state had more or less been wrought in the textual output of French
printing.376
In the first few years of the century, however, challenges did appear to this hegemonic
image of public science and the central place calculus occupied within it. There were those
within the Academy who did not endorse the analytical use to which calculus was being put.
These partisans of the “ancients,” as Fontenelle was sure to classify them, took to the old
Journal des sçavans to criticize Varignon and his collaborators in 1702.377 The newly founded
Jesuit publication, Journal de Trévoux, had been doing the same since the year before, but it
must have been a special shock that sçavans would turn on the Academy, but it had always been
in Colbert's sphere. In the interest of maintaining their good standing, Malebranche and Varignon
recruited Joseph Saurin, a analytical mechanist from outside the Academy, to respond on their
behalf in Journal des sçavans in 1703; when Bignon intervened, he was able to forbid Varignon
and his antagonist publish further responses, and had to call on Saurin's “honor as a gentleman to
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do the same.”378 Bignon eventually followed up by threatening to “block the renewal of the
Journal [de Trévoux'] printing privilege.”379
Saurin was eventually inducted in 1707 under Varignon's sponsorship, and was rapidly
promoted up the Academy hierarchy.380 Varignon was then able to sponsor another new analytic,
René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur to join the following year, and Réaumur was allowed to
publish that same year.381 Fontenelle went as far as to comment on the rising stardom which
seemed to be attracted to Varignon, as though he himself had not crafted that narrative. Selecting
for analytical mechanists was just the first step, and was followed by the exaggeration of their
homogeneity and then the marginalization of their detractors. Bignon also took a hand in
Réaumur's career after 1708, quickly making him a full pensioner. Réaumur was to be praised
for his accessible and entertaining style by both Fontenelle and the Jesuits alike.382 But it was not
to last, and the beauty of science has ultimately proven to be its ability to give way. But briefly,
the French establishment, and even to a large extent the English one, were in some kind of
agreement. Varignon had synthesized not only the ideality of mathmatics with Malebranche's
metaphysical account of perception as being oriented towards such ideals, but also merged the
practical and de facto approved reading of Descartes with the productive interests of the state.
The virtue of this discovery in itself was no more disrupted by its prized role within the French
establishment than earlier ones had been invalidated by official condemnation. However, the
downside of sponsorship over marginalization is the likelihood that such ideas overstay their
welcome; when Bernoulli visited the Academy a few decades after he and Malebranche had
helped to introduce calculus there, he was horrified to discover that it was being “misapplied” by
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many, as though compulsory stagnation made it difficult to distinguish the good froth the bad.383
But at any rate, it was Newton's 1706 work called Opticks, in which he made sure to make its
account of universal gravitation unmistakable, which made the pax analytica untenable.384
At the height of its relevance and legitimacy at this time, the Cartesian establishment
which had defiantly rejected rapport began to agitate with increased coherence for
“verisimilitude.”385 This sort of language expresses in a word what is best described as a quasirealism, and which would characterize the response of the French Cartesian scientific
establishment to a growing number of voices which would oppose it. The year that Descartes
was later called “the greatest of geometers” by a Jesuit journal was the same year that a member
of the Academy broke rank, although the fact that it was Saurin again who did so indicates that
he was probably reprising his role as the fall guy.386 He did not do so in print, but instead spoke
out against attractionism at the Academy's “spring public assembly” at the beginning of that
year.387 It was a move that was unprecedented in the Academy's decade of formal existence, and
which set the tone for the begrudging Jesuit endorsement of Cartesianism against an occult new
science mentioned in the introduction. In a 1709 review of the 1702 work Astronomiae physicae
et Geometricae Elementa, by the radicalized British attractionist David Gregory, it was lamented
that “if only one could ignore [the attractionist] principle, the subtlety of the geometry that is
used throughout would make it an excellent work.”388 This sort of rhetoric, in addition of course
to comparisons between attractionism and Spinozism and thus implications of heresy,
characterized the polemical tradition to follow.389 He was charged with being unable to give an
383
384
385
386
387
388
389

Ibid., 74.
Ibid., 113.
Ibid., 111. Emphasis mine.
Ibid., 124.
Ibid.
Ibid., 125.
Ibid., 126.

107

account of the “inclination natural and occult [of bodies] to unite with one another” which was
central to his Newtonianism.390 This may very well have been the first instance of modern
theoretically-induced blindness. This is to say that it was less an issue of accounting for certain
phenomena, which universal gravitation did, but rather what it was technically possible to say
about phenomena, in giving that account. Because material bodies could at best be described as
giving the striking impression of interacting, but that this impression was only an occasion for
them to be mutually caused to change by God, no theory which drew upon their actual presence
was acceptable, and least of all one which assigned actual powers to the mere fact of that
presence. As the decade progressed, the dissonance of the Cartesian advocacy for a quasi-realism
in physics only became more pronounced. “It is here that the sympathies and attractions would
come to the rescue,” Fontenelle would later write in the introduction to a work on chemical
reactions, “if only there were such things.”391
An appreciation for this discursive situation of French Cartesian institutional science
circa 1709 marks the culmination of this history. What follows is well-studied as none other than
the Enlightenment, the great rupture in which the power of rationality triumphed over ignorance.
Hopefully, however, the linearity of that progression has been complicated by the preceding
narrative. For immediately preceding that break, the established discourse which was most
prominent in resisting the “modernity” of Newtonian experimentalism was not, as would
universally be assumed, that of traditional and uncritical dogma. It was Cartesianism that had
weathered that storm in the domain of cosmology. Instead of appearing too innovative,
Newtonianism seemed, in modern terms, to employ magical thinking, or to simply be naïve. It is
this, historically and arguably philosophically, that marks the division between philosophy and
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science. The metaphysical regime which reconciled the vagaries of perception with the
specificity of the new sciences took it as a necessary feature of knowledge that it features a
structurally implicit fallible observer; this system developed to accommodate the practical needs
of that res cogitans as both an epistemological ground and as a socially-bound human agent. But
the radicalism of that development could not possibly compare to that which sought to erase it.
The naïvete of the scholastics had been their faith in the inferential authority of “natural
judgment.”392 For those discourses which would most properly be called modern science, it
would be no less than the suggestion that no such judgment features in scientific explanation, or
in Newton's eventual words, “hypotheses non fingo.”393
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Conclusion
The famous declaration, typically translated as “I frame no hypotheses,” but presented
idiosyncratically here as I feign no under-fiction so as to highlight analogy of construction,
(admittedly across a Greco-Roman linguistic barrier) was Newton's great metaphysical
intervention. It appeared in his General Scholium, an addition to the 1713 reprint of Principia,
and thus falls outside of the strict time line of unnameable Cartesianism presented here, but at
any rate, Newton's silence on the matter had been taken as guilt of precisely this sort of
conviction. Of the cause, which the French demanded be understood prior to any toleration of
attractionist theories, and which Newton understood must “penetrate to the very centers of the
Sun and Planets, without suffering the least diminution of its force,” but of which he knew
nothing more, he refused the established demand that he give an account; this is the context of
hypotheses non fingo.394 Further elaboration on his anti-hypothetical method might seem strange
to the modern scientist, but in view of the occasional, probabilistic understanding of hypothetical
claims established by the occasionalist Cartesian establishment, Newton's argument that
“whatever is not deduc’d from the phaenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses,
whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in
experimental philosophy” is far more intelligible. Here he stakes his point of dispute on the
relationship between explanatory accounts and perceptual phenomena. The hypotheses of
Rohault and his followers, and particularly as explicated by Malebranche's vision in God, served
to account for the structural presence of understanding in the very act of bearing witness.
Whether or not it was strictly accurate, a hypothesis could explain a phenomenon in such a way
as to be wholly compatible with appearances, and would in that sense be the understanding of
what was seen. Simply put, establishment rationalism aimed to rationalize appearances.
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Phenomena were not the tool that they would become, but a feature of consciousness; it is
tempting to read in the Newtonian response the reassertion of the basis in the cogito and
subsequent subordination of the experiential components of res cogitans, but this is probably too
coherently philosophical. Newton, as the French were well aware, was less interested in
understanding than predicting, and saw this as the proper understanding of science. In his
introduction to the Principia, editor Roger Cotes demanded on the author's behalf, “shall gravity
be therefore called an occult cause, and thrown out of philosophy, because the cause of gravity is
occult and not yet discovered? …When we are arrived at the most simple cause we can go no
farther. Therefore no mechanical account or explanation of the most simple cause is to be
expected or given.”395 This is an irreconcilable break from the metaphysical tradition of science
which proceeded him. Newton presumes to shift from accounting for what seems to happen, to
what actually happens, and in this way returns to the world the naïvete of presuming to
apprehend actuality on a basis more fundamental than semblance. In a striking and antagonistic
reference to the way “a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with equal velocity” in
the vacuum of space, Newton advises that “the parity of reason must take place in the celestial
spaces above the Earth's atmosphere.”396 This would truly be met with laughter by French
Cartesians, who take the location of the reasoning subject to be a serious metaphysical question
with actual scientific implications. The rest of the Scholium is spent playing fast and loose with
ontological concepts in a way that indicates, at very least in comparison to his French
contemporaries, Newton cares little for the meaning inherent to words.397 If the man of letters is
to be distinguished from the man of numbers, then of the latter class Newton may be the first
395
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among the moderns. But with the inadequacy of the Cartesian phenomenalism also being
acknowledged, the historical situation of the subject-matter of ongoing dispute in the philosophy
of science is given here.
So too has a historical picture of an important moment of development of the sociopolitical and epistemological implications of the text been presented, namely the genesis of the
institutionalized academic journal. If the subordination, sterilization and mechanization of
descriptions of the natural world entails the masculinization of knowledge, then the
proceduralization of testimony reflects the masculinization of the known, and the ambitiously
sociable savant reflects the masculinization of the knower. Not only was Newtonian gravitation a
step back from the strictures of rationalism in epistemology, it also represents passing the related
peak of the descriptive authority which could be claimed in the text, for the “unseen nature” of
the mechanism “invalidates the authority of the individual since he is no longer capable of
limitless representation,” which Erickson takes as necessitating the turn towards instrumentalism
about scientific validity, and experimentalism as a way of erasing the traces of the limited
subject.398 Truth was subsequently recuperated as “facts [as] contextualized statements,”
validated not by the experience of the individual bearing testimony, but the “system that
produced them.”399 This logic demanded a greater emphasis on the masculinized style of writing
which allowed “the writer to speak as an outsider,” even as he became less of one in social terms,
and debatably so in ontological terms.400 It is interesting that specifically as the totalizing
descriptive power of Cartesianized writing gave way, the appeals to authority inherent to the
literary style of scientific prose only became more pronounced. This, in addition to the increased
emphasis on hustling for the sort of social stature that lends credence to one's claims, might
398
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actually reflect the demise of absolute description. The power to codify and control the truth
might have been unattainable on a true metaphysical level, but that seems to have had no effect
on the desire to do so, and the social practices which were established under Cartesian
metaphysical auspices. The ownership of discovery and the prestige of the author seem to have,
on a functional level, persisted by embracing the mere performativity of rational description, if
not the dream of certainty it once carried. It will be left to the reader to infer what stands to be
said about the modern history of science on this basis, as well as the nature of this work itself.
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